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Abstract 
The current literature on community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly concerned with 
discussing the failure of the programme. This is mainly done from a Western 
perspective with the same underlying assumption that Western institutions need to 
be in place in order for CBNRM to become successful. This leads to the question 
of whether the underlying assumption could be flawed? Theories shape the results 
and it is therefore possible that the perspective has created the failure. To 
understand and develop CBNRM to become more successful, a change in 
perspectives that takes grassroot levels (Ostrom 1990) and African structures 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2012) into account are needed. The study illustrates that 
since locals’ livelihoods are normally dependent on the natural resources, more is 
at stake for the citizens than for the central authorities regarding the management 
of it. Considering that many of the conditions for the alternative perspectives to 
function are in place, changing the perspective, from the top-down Western 
perspective, to more culturally sensitive ones is important to increase the 
understanding and to further develop the CBNRM programmes.  
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1 Introduction 
Managing natural resources has long been a challenge in developing countries 
where information is scarce, demands often high and the resources available to 
improve management often limited (Nunan 2006 p 1316). Since the 1980’s many 
African countries have implemented various decentralising reforms that involve 
the country’s natural resource management. Of these initiatives, several have been 
labelled community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). The 
definitions and practices of CBNRM are as many as there are countries with 
related programmes. Yet, the premise underlying the reforms is that sustainable 
management of natural resources is most likely where local users are able to 
manage and extract benefits from the resources (Nelson & Agrawal 2008 p 557). 
It is also believed that the people closest to the natural resources have better 
knowledge on how to manage them, and have more incentives to manage the 
resources sustainably (Nunan 2006 p 1317). The control over local natural 
resources has long been one of the key issues for rural populations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as they form the basis of the population’s daily livelihoods, and natural 
resources have therefore also created an important arena of political struggle.  
Although not named CBNRM until later, the characteristics of the programme 
can be derived from the colonial period, when local institutions based on 
traditional leadership were put in place varying according to a great range of 
cultures, ecologies and material needs. At this time, they were in many ways 
neglected by administrators, except for political and strategic control, labour 
mobilisation and later on, for soil and water conservation. (Blaikie 2006 p 1943) 
Yet, in the 1980’s, the programme evolved as part of the will to develop rural 
areas, involve local communities in development issues and – what initially was 
perceived most important - the conservation of natural resources that most rural 
dwellers depend on. The concept of CBNRM is based on common property 
management theory, which promotes resource ownership, control and use by local 
communities. It was founded in southern Africa, where Zimbabwe is often seen as 
the pioneer in the field, followed by Namibia. At the outset, the programmes 
focused on the management of wildlife, and had an aim to ensure that people 
living in areas rich in wildlife could also derive economic benefits such as 
employment and income from it. Over time it has diversified to comprise other 
natural resources such as veld products, rangelands, marine and costal resources 
as well. Similarly, the objectives evolved to include resource conservation, 
improving livelihoods, sustainable use of the natural resources, community-based 
tourism and environmental education for communities. (Sebele 2010 p 137ff)  
CBNRM is since then widely spread over Sub-Saharan Africa. No programme 
looks exactly the same, but all are founded in Western decentralisation theory. 
Many decentralising countries have in practice experienced problems regarding 
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the many – and sizeable – objectives of CBNRM. This has led to a considerable 
amount of critique against the programme as such, where previous research have 
subsequently criticised the decentralisation efforts because of, for instance, the 
lack of devolved power – many decentralisation efforts rather result in 
privatisation and/or deconcentration –, the reforms have not been established in 
law or implemented in practice, lack of mechanisms for downward accountability 
and lack of capacity. Criticism has also been aimed at the tendency of 
decentralised projects to mobilise people as labour rather than empowering them 
to make decisions for themselves. (Ribot 2003 p 56ff, Ribot 2004) Zambia and 
Lesotho are, as an example, referred to as less successful examples of 
decentralised natural resource management (NRM) because of, among other 
things, bureaucratic delays and its complicated organisational arrangements with 
overlapping mandates. Moreover, Malawi is less successful due to its lack of 
accountability and transparency on a local level, and Zimbabwe because of its 
lack of devolved powers. (Campbell & Shackleton 2001, Roe et al 2009) 
However, according to the literature, there are relatively successful cases too. 
The country that most often is seen as one of the most successful in the area is 
Namibia that in 1996, through a legal amendment constructed a more creative 
CBNRM where inhabitants create community conservancies in which its 
members manage as well as benefit from wildlife. Lately the programme has 
expanded to include management of forestry as well. By the end of 2007, 
communal land conservancies in Namibia covered 118,700 km2, involved over 
220 000 residents in 50 conservancies, and generated income and benefits 
totalling over 3,9 million US dollars (NACSO, MET), thus making it the biggest 
decentralisation effort of NRM in the region (Roe et al 2009 p 100).  
Research (i.e. Campbell & Shackleton 2001, Ribot 2004, Roe et al 2009) 
derive the Namibian success partly from its CBNRM model that in many ways 
has a unique design of its initiatives: for example, the rights granted to the 
communities over wildlife are relatively extensive and secure; they are conditional 
and can be revoked, but not limited to a specific term. Moreover, unlike all other 
countries in the region, there is no “middle-man” (such as district organisations) 
in Namibia between the local and the private sector, and conservancies can only 
come into existence through local voluntary initiation and being registered after 
having met the criteria set up (Murphree & Taylor 2009 p 117, Campbell & 
Shackleton 2001 p 91).  
 
1.1 Research problem and objective 
It is clear that previous research is very much occupied with discussing 
success and failure, and reasons for them, within CBNRM programmes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Interestingly, success is mainly discussed with Western 
decentralisation theory as an underlying assumption. The, in some countries, large 
amount of people included in the CBNRM programmes, and the big values it is 
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based on, are discussed as if it was a Western country decentralising its NRM, and 
perceived issues in all countries have been presented solutions based on 
democratic decentralisations that have taken place in the West. Consequently, 
Sub-Saharan African countries are successful or less successful in relation to how 
the Western nations deal with decentralisation, and the measure of success then 
assumes an African response to what could be called Western acculturation. It 
seems as though the point of departure – or input values – and the way of dealing 
with NRM is rather similar in previous research – that the theories shaping the 
outcome of the studies are very alike: research in the field could resemble what 
Kuhn (1970) refers to as a “paradigm”. Paradigms consist of models that create 
special coherent scientific traditions – or, thinking patterns – that in turn leads to 
certain conditions for what can be called “normal science”. Given that research 
draws on other research, what is written today is less likely to challenge the 
foundations on which the previous research lies, as the people within the same 
field have also acceded to the same rules and criteria for the research. (Kuhn 1970 
pp 22ff) On this account, we believe that we can make recommendations on how 
to organise CBNRM in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the model the recommendations 
is based on, is derived from a closed world, resting on “normal science”. Given 
that CBNRM is perceived mostly as a failure from the Western perspective, it 
leads to the question: 
 
• What if the underlying assumption is flawed? 
 
If the underlying assumption is flawed – or even wrong – in the way of discussing 
CBNRM it, itself, creates issues and failures in the programmes. The way 
CBNRM is handled as a democratisation process thus unables the success of the 
initiatives. As Allison and Zelikow (1999) and Lundquist (1993) argue, theories 
shape the evaluations, explanations and predictions (Allison & Zelikow 1999 p 7), 
and the result is dependent on the problem, method and material (Lundquist 1993 
p 119). The results are thus dependent on the input values.  
Hence, it is possible that new perspectives are needed in the CBNRM field. 
Previous research is based on an “outside” and “downward” perspective, yet other 
more “upwards” and locally rooted perspectives on decentralisation and NRM 
exist, but are overlooked in implementation and research on CBNRM. Ostrom’s 
“Governing the commons” (1990)1 is in this case an interesting perspective to 
depart from because she discusses decentralisation of NRM, but with a focus on 
the local level. From this perspective, and unlike the Western perspective, the best 
solutions to the management of resources do not come from the “outside”, but 
from within the communities, and local property can be successfully managed by 
the local commons and without the involvement of central authorities and 
privatisation. (Ostrom 1990) This perspective deals explicitly with NRM at a local 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Elinor Ostrom has a rich list of publications. The book “Governing the commons” (1990) is however considered 
as her “master piece” and her later work is to large extent follow-ups of it (Lewin in SvD 1999). For this reason I 
have chosen to depart from this 1990 publication, and not her later work. 
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level yet, interestingly, most research sets out on the foundation of this 
perspective, with for instance the idea that local people can manage their own 
resources, but research still shift the focus to the importance of the central state 
(Roe et al p 7ff).  
 
Another approach that is often overseen but still an applicable dimension in 
the CBNRM debate, is that by Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) that at a local level 
takes on a governance perspective, where the indigenous African structures are 
seen as something that should be integrated into the model; for example the 
position of “traditional leaders”. This is in stark contrast to the existing research, 
where the underlying assumption is that programmes should implemented from 
the top down and based in Western structures. 
Consequently, there are other perspectives on NRM, and since CBNRM now 
may be trapped in “normal science”, it leads to the question:  
 
• How could we understand and develop CBNRM in alternative ways, 
taking grassroot levels and African structures into account? 
 
Because underlying assumptions could affect perceptions of success I will, in the 
pursuance of this broad question, pay special attention to the following: 
  
• Perspectives on success 
o The influence of policy and governance 
o The influence of power 
o The influence of context 
 
The purpose of the study is to analyse CBNRM from different perspectives and 
increase our understanding of the success and/or failure of such programmes. The 
concept “governance” will in this thesis be used as shorthand for formal 
structures, that is, how the system is organised. The other subcategories, 
subordinate to that of perspectives on success, are rather closely entangled, 
especially governance and power. Nonetheless, the categorisation here is based in 
“governance” being how the system is organised, whereas “power” regards how 
the power is distributed, which is not necessarily according to the formal 
structures.  
The thesis begins with a brief history of the management of natural resources 
and is followed by an account of how CBNRM can be described. After the 
methods have been described, previous literature is assessed and reported on 
which will then form what I will refer to as the Western perspective. The 
alternative perspectives that I will set in relation to the Western perspective, is 
outlined. This is followed by an analysis where the alternative perspectives are set 
in relation to the Western perspective – what happens to the result when one of 
the components – theory – of the research changes? – and after that a conclusion 
and discussion on the findings. 
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2 Approaching natural resource 
management in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa has during the last decades become increasingly interesting to 
the surrounding world, as the continent’s natural resources have proven valuable. 
The wide variety of resources not only consist of non-renewable ones, i.e. oil, gas 
and metals, but also – as typically employed in CBNRM – forest, open woodland 
or livestock grazing, wood supply, medicines, and famine foods; farm land for 
gleaning, grazing after harvest and crop residues; wildlife for game meat and 
safari incomes; fish in fresh water lakes; aquifers, tanks and irrigation channels 
for domestic and livestock water supply and irrigation (Blaikie 2006 p 1942). The 
revenues generated from these resources and the management of it varies, and so 
the question on how to best manage these resources is being widely debated in 
academia as much as in governments, leaving the management of natural 
resources in many places to be characterised by “a complex web of interests and 
tradeoffs between interacting sets of local people, government departments, 
national and international planners, and professional advisers” (Grimble & 
Wellard 1997 p 177).  
The management of natural resources goes far back in history, during which 
time the views on NRM very much could be divided into two camps: the 
conservationists that focused on the sustainable use of natural resources for 
human benefits, and the preservationists that believed in protecting the 
environment from human impacts for its own sake so future generations could 
enjoy and experience nature as had their predecessors. Even NRM today contain 
elements of these both views. (Padgett et al 2012 p 20) Proper management of 
natural resources is thus important for reasons posed by both of the above 
perspectives: the, in many Sub-Saharan countries, vast amount of natural 
resources that can be used for economic advantage, are important sources for 
incomes i.e. exports, and big game hunting, but they are also important for 
national reasons such as food security.  
There are various approaches on how states handle NRM; top-down, adaptive 
management, and the latest way of doing so is through varying degrees of 
decentralisation. Given the history of NRM in Sub-Saharan Africa, where small 
villagers traditionally had been the owners and regulators of the natural resources, 
the nationalisation of the resources were seen as expropriation (Ostrom 1990 p 23) 
Binot et al (2009 pp14ff) divide the different approaches to community 
involvement in NRM into three (see Table 1), after their level of state/community 
involvement; in Protected area (PA) outreach the communities are passive 
beneficiaries of NRM that are conducted by other PA managers. The state is the 
resource proprietor and the community’s role is to cooperate with PA managers in 
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protecting the PA’s resources. Community involvement via co-management is 
where communities participate through co-management agreements or other 
forms of involvement. The state is the resource proprietor, but it may decentralise 
or deconcentrate the management. In this case the communities cooperate with 
state authorities in the management of PA or the natural resource in question. The 
third approach to community involvement, and the one that I will depart from, is 
CBNRM, which will be defined under section 2.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
Resource proprietor Community role Level of local 
participation 
Protected area (PA) 
outreach and 
benefit sharing 
State Receive benefits from 
PA managers; co-
operate with PA 
managers in protecting 
PA resources 
Weak; participation 
limited to largely 
passive actions 
Co-management (or 
joint management) 
State but may be 
decentralised or 
deconcentrated 
Co-operate with state 
authorities in 
management of the PA 
or resurce in question 
Medium; depends on 
the rights and 
responsibilities 
granted to local 
communities in a 
given situation 
CBNRM Local communities 
through collective 
representative body 
Resource management 
through either 
delegated usufruct 
rights (user rights) or 
outright proprietorship 
High; communities 
as main proprietors, 
decision-makers, and 
beneficiaries 
Table 2.1: A spectrum of approaches to community involvement in natural resources management (Roe et al 2009 p 
15) 
 
 
CBNRM is the type of NRM that is most established locally, and given that 
international donors also extensively support CBNRM initiatives, it is of a more 
general interest to examine this more closely. Moreover, considering the donors’ 
support, the literature is mostly occupied with this type of NRM.  
2.1 Defining community-based natural resource 
management 
In order to discuss CBRNM, an understanding of what the concept can be is 
required. There are many definitions used to discuss the phenomena; minimalistic 
definitions include, for instance, Murphree’s (2009 p 2553) “the communal 
management of natural resource commonages where the grasp of direct state 
management does not reach” and Boudreaux & Nelson’s (2011 p 17) “a strategy 
for allocating and managing use and benefit rights over resources”.  Fabricius & 
Collins (2007 p 83) puts more emphasis on human values in their definition of 
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CBNRM as something that “focuses on the collective management of ecosystems 
to promote human well-being and aims to devolve authority for ecosystem 
management to the local (community) level”. More specific definitions is 
exemplified by Child & Barnes’s (2010 p 283) “a rigorous process of institutional 
reform that combines the devolution and delineation of property rights with 
collective action in rural communities to improve the value of sustainability of 
wild resources”. 
Roe & Nelson (2009a p 5) also draws on a more general definition of the 
concept and defines it as “a term to describe the local management of resources 
such as land, forests, wildlife and water by collective, local institutions for local 
benefits” that can take many different forms in different locations, socio-political 
and bio-physical contexts.  
Binot et al (2009a p 13) notes that CBNRM not only has different meanings in 
academia, but that there is also a discrepancy in the use of the concept’s inherent 
and operational definition. For instance, the inherent CBNRM definition is that 
local groups of people (communities) manage resources in an active manner and 
with some significant degree of formal (de jure) or informal (de facto) control or 
tenure over those resources. However, the operational definition, which is mostly 
used by governments and donors, include a wider range of local level 
involvement, ranging from passive to active in NRM. Given this difference in 
operational and substantive definition, CBNRM may in practice refer to a wide 
range of different modes of local involvement in NRM, including protected area 
(PA) outreach or other instances where communities are not actually managing 
much themselves. Yet, substantively, CBRNM requires that local people have a 
reasonable degree of tenure control over lands and resources, and themselves can 
make decisions about resource use, allocation and access in order to manage and 
conserve natural resources based on their own social and economic interest to 
sustainably use the resources. (Binot et al 2009a p 13f)  
 It is evident that there are many definitions of CBNRM, some authors are 
even referring to CBNRM yet by using the term “decentralised natural resource 
management”. For this reason I will use a generous definition of the concept for 
the literature review I will conduct, in order not to miss out on any important 
information. Departing from an all too narrow definition such as Child & Barnes’s 
(2010) may obstruct and/or hamper the possibilities of other ways to understand 
CBNRM.2 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 CBNRM is recurrently criticised for the usage of concepts like “community” and “insitutions” (see i.e. Blaikie 
2006, Nunan 2006) – two main components of the initiative. This is however not dealt with in this study since it 
is concerned primarily with the theoretical discussion of the programme rather than the phenomenon. The 
mentioned critique lies in the latter, and is therefore not discussed.   
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2.1.1 The relation between CBNRM and CPR 
The perspective proposed by Ostrom’s (1990) is founded in CPR:s. It is therefore 
important to discern what type of NRM it is, and what the relation between CPR 
and CBNRM looks like.  
A CPR can be defined as a “natural or man-made resource system that is 
sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.” Ostrom (1990 p 30). In her 
theoretical framework, Ostrom distinguishes between resource systems and 
resource units produced by the system, while still acknowledging the 
interdependence between the two. Resource systems are defined as “stock 
variables that are capable, under favourable conditions, of producing a maximum 
quantity of a flow variable without harming the stock of or the resource system 
itself”, and can for example be fishing grounds, groundwater basins, lakes etc. 
Resource units are what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems, 
which can be illustrated by fish harvested from fishing grounds. (Ostrom 1990 p 
30)  
  The relation between CPR and CBNRM in turn, can be understood in that 
CBNRM is based, at least in its underlying conceptual foundations if not always 
in its implementation, on scholarship on CPR. Traditionally, some resources have 
been managed collectively rather than individually because the resources are 
subject to shared uses, and would be costly to manage individually (Roe & Nelson 
2009a p8). CBNRM can also be considered as a way to handle the otherwise 
cumbersome CPR (Andersson et al 2004 p 421). Consequently, the NRM logic 
can be arranged accordingly: CPR is a version of NRM, and CBNRM is a version 
of CPR (see Figure 1).  
  
 
 
 
 
NRM 
CPR 
CBNRM 
Figure 1: Logic of NRM systems 
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3 Methods 
“The purpose of research is to contribute in some way to our understanding of the 
world” says Hart (1998 p 12). An important part, integral to the success of 
research is the literature review, where “the selection of available documents on 
the topic (…) written from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express 
certain views of the nature of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the 
effective evaluation of these documents in relation to the research being 
proposed” takes place before the “proper” research commences (Hart 1998 p 13). 
Critical reading is thus very important to be able to contribute to knowledge, since 
knowledge generation and understanding are an emergent process and not a 
universal product. To know the nature and character of the implications of a 
development (research that is), you need to know the intellectual context of that 
development. (Hart 1998 p 26)  
In order to examine the research question on whether the underlying 
assumption is flawed, I first conducted a thorough literature review on previous 
research to see what the perspective in use was. I analysed the material in order to 
identify the underlying assumption, which gave me the background to discuss the 
consequence of this perspective, and additionally what happens if the perspective 
is replaced, by alternative perspectives.  
The first part of the study can thus be described as “research on research” 
where the previous literature serves as the empirics. The processing used in the 
study will allow for a deeper knowledge and understanding of the field (Patel & 
Davidson 1994 p 99f).  
For a deeper knowledge of the field, a sort of text analysis would traditionally 
be conducted, yet the purpose of the literature review is to extract assumptions, 
concepts, and key ideas from the previous research hence techniques such as for 
example discourse analysis, content analysis or similar are beyond the scope of 
this review’s interest (Hart 1998 p 110).  
 
3.1 Doing the literature review 
The concept ”analysis” can be defined as the act of “systematically breaking down 
something into its constituent parts and describing how they relate to each other – 
it is not random dissection but a methodological examination” (Hart 1998 p 110).  
Reviewing research is about evaluating the logical coherence of theories, 
methodologies and findings in a context of informed scholarship (Hart 1998 p 44). 
Drawing on the definition of analysis, the elements constituting the scientific text, 
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needs to be identified and systematically broken down, which I did by recreating 
the research process according to Lundquist’s (1993) model (see section 3.1.1). 
Recreating the research process will discern the structure of the text and what the 
perspectives in use are. Yet, some of the texts were less perspicuous in their 
research process, and more or less explicit in their way of dealing with NRM, 
meaning that I – to a certain extent – needed to interpret the underlying message 
of the text. As Fairclough argue: 
 
it is clear that some texts receive a great more interpretative work than others; 
some texts are very transparent, others more or less opaque to particular 
interpreters; interpretation is sometimes unproblematic and effectively automatic, 
but sometimes highly reflexive, involving a great deal of conscious thought about 
what is meant, or why something has been said or written as it has. 
    (Fairclough in May 2011 p 152) 
 
According to the hermeneutics we cannot disengage from our subject matter, but 
must proclaim our commitment and engagement as a condition of understanding 
social life. The research we undertake depends on our way to understand and 
interpret social life. (May 2011 p 14) This, I believe, relate not only to traditional 
interview-, document- etc. analyses, but just as much to reviewing earlier 
literature; my preconceptions may have influenced the way I interpreted the texts. 
However, as the purpose of the review was to reconstruct the research process, the 
interpretations of the implicit ways NRM has been dealt with ought to be fewer 
than the explicit ones. Moreover, I have tried to describe the actual interpretations 
that I made and they are based on a model, thereby allowing the reader to form an 
opinion about the interpretations made in the text. 
 
 
3.1.1 Lundquist’s model 
Lundquist’s (1993 p 116ff) model “The research process between reality and 
result” serves as a model for the analysis of the research process. Lundquist 
(1993) presents the model as a tool for the researcher to deal with the 
methodological challenges of the relation between “reality” and “the result” in the 
research process. The main idea of the model is that what takes place in the 
process sets the scene for what will then be selected as material, for what is 
analysed and ultimately presented as the result (Lundquist 1993 p 117).  The 
model is based on the elements that, according to Lundquist (Ibid), take place in 
the research process; namely problem, theory, methods, analysis, reality, material 
and result (see Figure 2). 
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According to the model, the researcher looks upon reality based on certain beliefs 
that are determined by the methodology. After the methodology has confronted 
reality, the analysis is provided a material. (Lundquist 1993 p 118) The material is 
thus a reflection of the reality shaped by the methodology, and the material 
therefore “only answer the questions that the scientist pose, recognises only the 
phenomena that the theory identifies, and only reflect the aspects of the 
phenomena the method is able to capture” (Ibid.). 
In order to give the building blocks of the research process attention, that 
likewise constitute the building blocks of the research itself, it is of interest to 
review the previous literature according to this model. Analysing the texts 
departing from the model will provide a good understanding of how the literature 
has dealt with the decentralisation of NRM. 
Hence, the focus of the literature review was on untangling the previous 
research’s formulation of problems, theory, methods, material and the result to 
see whether there might be a paradigm in the way the research has been conducted 
in the NRM field. Similarly, the reality is taken into account: the reality in this 
case is the Sub-Saharan African context, and this model will expose how the 
reality has been dealt with based on the theoretical presumptions. However, the 
reality of reviewing articles is that it is often difficult to separate analysis from 
results. For this reason I decided to combine these two components and 
operationalize the analysis, looking for specific elements in it. This way, some 
specific parts of the analysis that are of most interest are exposed, whereas the 
main aspects of the article is brought to light in the results component. The 
operationalization of the concepts from which I depart in the analysis was then 
rather open, since the main objective was to gain an understanding of what the 
research consists of, and it’s explicit and implicit presumptions. Too narrow and 
too many parameters would hinder this full understanding. Nevertheless, there are 
some parameters I payed close attention to: what elements are needed for success 
and what elements that hinder success, that is failure. The definition of success 
was also emphasised in the review, since this provided an understanding of what 
the literature is trying to achieve. 
Figure 2: The research process between reality and result (Lundquist 1993 p 118) 
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Finally, Lundquist’s (1993) model was employed in the second part of the 
study, where one of the components of the model – that is theory – is replaced 
with Ostrom’s (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) theories to see how 
this may change the other components of the model. 
 
3.2 Choice of alternative perspectives 
The thesis thus not only consists of a literature review, but also puts the previous 
research (called the Western perspective) in relation to two alternative 
perspectives by Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012). The intention 
is not to compare the perspectives with each other, since the purpose is not to 
describe differences or similarities, or to explain how and why these differences 
occur (May 2011 p 254) but more to replace the various perspectives to create a 
better understanding of CBNRM. 
The perspectives challenging the paradigm/the Western perspective are 
Ostrom’s (1990) “Governing the commons” and Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) 
“Theory from the south”. These were chosen as they shift the focus on, what I 
believe can be summed up as top down institution building based on exported 
models from the West, to more “upwards” thinking. The Western perspective 
could be seen as detached from the Sub-Saharan African context – or reality – in 
that it, as argued above, discusses CBNRM as it was a western country 
decentralising its CBNRM. This is in stark contrast to the other perspectives that I 
aim to compare to, which relies more on context and institution building from 
below.  
The framework proposed by Ostrom (1990) is not unexplored in research on 
natural resource management: For example, Agrawal (2001), Boudreaux & 
Nelson (2011), German & Keeler (2010) refer to and discuss it. However, they 
discuss the perspective in general terms (apart from Boudreaux & Nelson (2011)), 
and thereby disregard the country specific context that is of value when discussing 
success or lack thereof in CBNRM. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, as 
Roe & Nelson (2009a p 7ff) argue, the central assumption of CBNRM that local 
people will be able to manage lands and natural resources through locally devised 
rules and procedures as communal property, is indeed predicated on Ostrom’s 
work. Most research thus sets out on the foundation of this perspective, yet they 
focus on top-down institution building, instead of Ostrom’s way of analysing the 
CPR. The framework is concerned with CPR situations that can be described as 
one level of NRM out of which CBNRM has grown as a lower level. Given that 
CBNRM is now trapped in “normal science”, going back to the source of the 
concept and the way of thinking about NRM originally could offer a different 
perspective on CBNRM: perhaps parts of the big picture, that is CPR, have been 
forgotten when trying to make it more accessible and easy to work with? Or, the 
big picture might even been forgotten when moulding the perspective to conform 
with Western decentralisation models?  
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Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) offer an interesting governance perspective 
within the African context that is often overlooked, with the role of traditional 
leaders. Relating this perspective to the otherwise top-down oriented approaches 
with governance concerns in the Western perspective to the NRM field, I believe, 
might change the outcomes of Lundquist’s model given that what we would call 
“good governance” is traditionally in place in their study. Moreover, integrating 
the CBNRM field with that of traditional leaders and democratic governance is of 
particular interest since there across Africa is a long tradition of traditional 
approaches to the management of natural resources, consisting of a wide array of 
indigenous resource systems (Binot et al 2009 p 31).  Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2012) base their study on one country - Botswana – more specifically the 
chiefdom Tswana – a country that is of course unique. However, they note some 
circumstances that enabled the chiefdom to work the way it did: its comparative 
ethnic homogeneity, its small size and its proximity to a particular historical past. 
These realities do not obtain everywhere in the world, yet they argue, “the 
vernacular political forms found there bear strong similarities to others in Africa, 
some of them clearly visible, some submerged, some violently suppressed”. 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 130) Most countries thus have/have had these 
traditional political forms and institutions, which could make it work in other 
contexts as well. However, the fact that the Tswana people were fairly democratic 
does not mean all of the indigenous societies were (nor all the Tswana kings). It 
should be remembered though, especially when using this perspective elsewhere, 
that the understanding of “traditional” tenure vary from country to country, and 
even chiefdom to chiefdom, and that the concept therefore can be highly 
controversial. The legitimacy of “traditional” governance institutions is often 
contested in countries where the institutions were defined or even established by 
colonial administrators (which was common for natural resource management) for 
indirect rule. It may be argued that such institutions are not traditional at all, since 
they were bestowed on them. (Mamdani 1996) With regards to this, some caution 
has to be taken when referring to some of the management as traditional.  
The relatively recent publication by Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) makes 
this perspective new to the field of CBNRM. Although, Comaroff and Comaroff 
have published plenty before, it seems as though their perspective has not been 
taken into account in this field. 
 
 
3.3  Material 
Since part of the study can be described as “research on research” the empirics of 
it is the earlier research in the field. The literature will not exclusively be used for 
composing the “Western perspective” but also to exemplify how NRM is dealt 
with in some Sub-Saharan countries, as part of the reality. 
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For the literature review I have chosen to analyse articles rather than books, 
since articles in general are more up-to-date than books. Articles are also often 
more specific than books in the area for research, meaning that some subjects of 
“fields within a field”, such as CBNRM are too narrow to carry an entire book 
(Reinecker & Stray Jørgensen 2006 p 217f).  
Articles chosen for the literature review have been gathered by systematic 
searches in the Lund University Libraries search engine for general articles on the 
topic, as well as the citation-based search engine Scopus. The general articles 
were chosen based on relevance, and served as a way to get an overall picture of 
the topic. In order to get a better understanding of what is most influential in the 
field I decided to complement these articles by doing systematic searches based 
on number of citations in the search engine Scopus. Scopus is the largest abstract 
and citation database of peer-reviewed literature, and in comparison to the other 
citation oriented database Web of Science, Scopus has a bigger scope (LU 
Libguides), which is an advantage when trying to get an overview of what has 
been written in the field. However, Web of Science, unlike Scopus, has a more 
complete database of citations prior to 1996 (LU Libguides). On the grounds that 
this study is more interested in what is currently being written in the NRM-field, 
articles published before 1996 are not considered in the analysis, and the lack of 
articles before 1996 is less of a problem. Moreover, as research refers to previous 
research, the literature published before 1996 is likely to be taken into account 
despite the scope of the database. The relevant literature was found using the flow 
chart of the literature search constructed by Hart (1998 p 34ff) in which I started 
out by an initial mapping of the topic area, and an identification of sources of 
information and guides to the literature (in this case Scopus). The following 
detailed search of sources helped to identify articles and reports. This detailed 
search will be elaborated below. 
3.3.1 Selection of articles in Scopus 
The main tactic in order to navigate the vast literature and to make the analysis of 
the earlier research as influential as possible was to choose articles with the most 
citations.  
The number of citations of an article indicates how much referred to an article 
is by other authors, and therefore also indicates what is mostly talked about within 
the field – the core ideas of the literature (Hart 1998 p 39). Selecting the most 
frequently cited articles thus gives an understanding on how research most often 
deals with CBNRM: the more citations, the more established is the way of 
handling/thinking about CBNRM. Moreover, the criterion of citations is of high 
relevance since it helps identifying the core works in a field (Hart 1998 p 39f). 
These are often the most prominent works and the ones who set the agenda, which 
means that it is often this particular research that is being discussed. However, 
using a large number of citations as a criterion is not entirely without problems; it 
also has the consequence that newer research might be disregarded given that it 
has not had enough time to be cited yet. To make sure that the articles are still 
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valid in today’s research I selected only articles that had been referred to in recent 
years. If the articles are referred to in today’s research, the older ones are still 
relevant and set the agenda in the field.  Moreover, when using number of 
citations as an important criterion for selection, it is important to note that the 
most cited work is not necessarily the most important; it is not a judgement of 
quality or importance, but merely a nominal count of use by others (Hart 1998 p 
33). Of interest in the literature analysis is however what is most talked about, and 
how most deal with NRM, not just to find the most notable works within the field. 
Yet, as stated above, the most notable works are often the ones that set the agenda, 
and to identify these more criteria are necessary. 
Given that the articles should be relatively representative as to how the 
literature organise decentralised NRM, I selected articles where some of the 
literature deals with decentralised NRM on a general basis, whereas some deals 
with it based on country-specific analysis. Variation in the sample where only a 
few but different cases are included, will disclose the potential range of variation 
and differentiation in the field (Flick 2009 p 122). The reviewed articles have 
been published between 2000 and today, and will therefore provide an overview 
of how research is conducted today in the field. Using relatively recent research is 
also helpful to understand the earlier literature, since research, as Lundquist (1993 
p 114) argue could to a certain extent be seen as cumulative, and thus draw on 
previous studies.  
Another important criterion when selecting the articles was relevance. The 
voluminous fields of NRM and CBNRM, consists of many different research 
fields including for instance biology, geology, political science, development etc. 
and many different kinds of natural resources. The aim was to include as many of 
these as possible (as long as relevant). Since the programme is not exclusive to 
Africa, but also exist in Asia, many of the articles also concern CBNRM at this 
continent as well. Despite some of the articles are not purely African; this could 
also be advantageous as it will add other aspects to CBNRM. Determining what is 
relevant to the study is therefore of great importance, and I did so partly by 
modifying the search criteria, and partly by reading the abstracts.  
Additionally I, given the great importance of management of natural resources 
in general, and what I believe is a “western way of thinking” around it, also set 
out to see whether there were any African authors writing about CBNRM, and if 
their work differed in relation to the “western” way of dealing with it.  
When searching the database Scopus based on these criteria, the following 
findings were made. 
 
3.3.2 Search results – selection of articles 
The search for articles started with defining the research topic that is natural 
resource management. This was followed by narrowing down the field to 
CBNRM, out of which the search criteria were developed taking account of what 
to include and exclude (Hart 2001 p 23). Despite the focus on CBNRM I decided 
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to include “decentralisation natural resources” in the search results as the 
discussion on decentralisation of NRM in practice often refers to CBNRM 
reforms, since CBNRM is a version of NRM decentralisation (see figure 2). As 
stated earlier, the line between what is CBNRM, PA outreach and decentralisation 
of natural resources is rather blurred in practice (see section 2.0) this will be 
reflected in the selection of articles. Some may not define some articles, or parts 
of them, as CBNRM but rather as “decentralised NRM” and vice versa. However, 
considering that there is no definite definition of CBNRM, these double sided 
articles can be valuable as well. 
Starting out by searching for CBNRM OR "community-based natural resource 
management” OR decentralization natural resources in article title, abstract and 
keywords with no specified date range, the database returned 643 document 
results. The results showed that the top three most cited articles were although 
very well cited, but all from late 90’s, making the research less relevant, for 
reasons earlier stated. Another consequence of the search was that the results also 
took research on Asia and Europe into account, and thus failed to meet the 
relevance criteria. Discussions on CBNRM in Europe or Asia could imaginably be 
relevant for the general discussion on CBNRM; nonetheless, the ample material is 
likely to divulge these considerations anyway despite a focus on Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
I therefore narrowed down the search criteria further to CBNRM OR 
"community-based natural resource management" OR decentralization natural 
resources and added Africa as an additional search field. I also changed the date 
range for the publications to 2000 – present to make it reflect current research. A 
citation analysis in its purest form, include going through the entire range of 
articles, starting with the oldest articles in the list, and working through to the 
most recent, in order to show the increase and decrease of citations of a work over 
time (Hart 1998 p 39). Yet, the main focus of this study is on what is talked about 
today, and the years of publication have therefore been narrowed down. This 
search retrieved 144 document results where the top 10 most cited articles showed 
a good variation in the publication date and scientific journals, however, many of 
the articles, at a glance, still did not come across as particularly focused on 
discussing success and failure; and so the search criteria had to change yet again.  
Adding AND success in the same search field as Africa the search engine 
retrieved 17 results, where many of the results were African authors from African 
universities. I decided to see what happens if one replaces success with failure and 
out of the 7 results, all of the authors were westerners from western universities. 
What does this mean? Are Africans more positive to CBNRM than people in the 
West, and if they are – why? Could it be because they are more familiar/sensitive 
to African values than are western researchers? However, it turned out that most 
of these articles were more nuanced in their argumentation than it seemed in the 
title and abstract. The majority of the articles with “success” in their title or 
abstract also contain “failure”. However, many of the articles from the search with 
“failure” are primarily concerned with failure and not success.  
Based on these searches I selected 25 articles – some chosen from the searches 
with failure and success as a variable, and some from the more general search. 
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Moreover, I made sure to select articles with a variation in cases – some focusing 
on specific countries, and others that treat the subject in more general terms. The 
selected articles and their main elements are presented in the appendix (Table 5).  
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4 Theoretical framework 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse how different perspectives on CBNRM 
can increase our understanding of the success and/or failure of these types of 
programmes. To do so, I will in this section describe how the current literature 
deals with CBNRM. Thereafter I will describe the alternative perspectives by 
Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012). Since the study is based on 
the notion that most of what is written on CBNRM in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
predicated on what Western countries believe constitute good decentralisation, I 
will refer to this model as “the Western perspective”. Although not all research is 
conducted this way (after all Ostrom, Comaroff and Comaroff are all westerners, 
and the literature include African authors) I believe that the model is to a great 
extent founded in Western decentralisation models during the creation and 
implementation of the programmes. The perspective can thus be seen as 
representative to the Western way of thinking. 
4.1 The Western perspective 
Literature on CBNRM most often focuses the discussion on the reasons for the 
many failures of CBNRM, rather than the cases of success (Measham & Lumbasi 
2013 p 649). The reason for this focus is that failure is considerably more 
prevalent than success. There are, as Murphree (2009 p 2552) puts it; “a few 
spectacular successes, a number of perverse outcomes and a plethora of examples 
between the two extremes, usually showing little progress and chronic inertia”. 
Given this pessimistic focus, much of the literature is dedicated to evaluate 
present programmes to identify non-favourable elements for the functioning of 
CBNRM, and to thereafter provide recommendations on how to achieve a 
successful programme. 
 
4.1.1 Success in CBNRM 
Considering the great emphasis on success and failure, it is important first to 
define what “success” can be according to the literature, before discussing what 
elements are considered important for the success of it.  
The definition for what success in CBNRM is varies greatly depending on 
author. Success can be seen as reaching the objectives of the programme, and 
most therefore depart from their definition of CBNRM and its aims. For Roe et al 
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(2009b p ix) success in CBNRM seems to be when rural communities are 
flourishing, and sustainably managing their land and natural resources. Child & 
Barnes (2010 p 284) considers CBNRM successful when it controls high-value 
uses, which include both monetary values (i.e. incomes from hunting) and non-
monetary values (i.e. proprietorship or eco-system services), and the political 
transformation that takes place through democratisation, equity, transparency and 
accountability (Ibid.). Boudreaux & Nelson (2011 p 17) define success based on 
their case Namibia, and recognise that successful CBNRM is when “local 
management of wildlife and other resources can produce positive outcomes such 
as rural economic development, a healthier environment and improved local 
governance”, which is a definition that Collomb et al. (2010) seems to depart from 
as well. Measham & Lumbasi (2013 p 650) converge on the principle that 
CBNRM is successful when it encourages “better resource management outcomes 
through wide participation of local communities in decision-making activities and 
the incorporation of local knowledge systems in management processes”. 
Fabricius & Collins (2007 p 84) consider the aim of CBNRM to empower 
communities to manage their own resources without permanently damage, deplete 
or degrade them. Campbell & Shackleton (2001 p 88) have another take on what 
makes a successful CBNRM; “systems where stakeholders, particularly local 
people, have a positive attitude towards CBNRM, and sustainability appears to 
have been achieved”.  
When defining success, most research clearly departs from a wide and general 
objective. Despite formulating it in different ways, it is sound to say that the core 
values of the definitions of a successful CBNRM are the same:  
 
• local management,  
• local economic development  
• sustainability in management of the natural resources.  
 
Interestingly, only a very few authors depart from the country’s programme 
objectives that are given as an example in their article, and evaluate their outcome 
to see whether it is delivering the goals set up. 
4.1.2 Required elements for success 
The literature shows that part of why CBNRM fails is that the government is 
reluctant to devolve sufficient powers to the communities (Brian & Weaver 2009; 
Ribot 2003, 2004, 2006; Measham & Lumbasi 2013; Oyono 2004; Mbaiwa 2004; 
Brockington 2008; Hutton et al 2005) and that the power that is transferred, is 
often transferred to various unaccountable local bodies (Ribot 2003, 2004; 
Shackleton et al 2002; Meshack et al 2006) which threaten local equity and the 
environment. For instance, donors often sideline elected local authorities because 
of donors’ general lack of confidence in them (Ribot 2003). The lack of power on 
a local level affect, for instance, the authority to deal with raiding wildlife – which 
in turn affect the ways the many human-wildlife conflicts are dealt with – 
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(Shackleton et al 2002; Boudreaux & Nelson 2011). Moreover, many 
management decisions like for example when to harvest, are still taken by the 
central government (Jones & Weaver 2009) and the locals are, in the forest sector, 
most often only given the power to allocate commercially irrelevant use for 
products like for example non-commercial firewood instead of the revenue-rich 
commercial right to exploit the forests. By controlling the amount of space over 
which local authorities can exercise their power, it becomes possible to control the 
extent of the undertaken decentralisation. (Ribot 2006) Many central governments 
are thus de facto – despite rhetoric to the contrary – managing the locals and 
continue to drive the NRM agenda. Consequently, CBNRM is by many seen as a 
way for the government to motivate local actors to carry out new environmental 
management responsibilities that meet government revenue or conservation 
interests, rather than local livelihood needs (Ribot 2003, 2004; Shackleton et al 
2002). Additionally, the intervening high levels of government leads to 
compromised applications that undermine both the integrity of participation, and 
the effectiveness of the conservation programmes (Measham & Lumbasi 2013; 
Meshack et al 2006). Another issue presented in previous research is the unclear 
and unstable institutional environment, in which institutions claim overlapping 
authority over land and natural resources (Jones & Weaver 2009; Campbell & 
Shackleton 2001; Measham & Lumbasi 2013; Shackleton et al 2002; Fabricius & 
Collins 2007; Oyono 2004). Low coordination and participation between 
institutions such as local and national, and various stakeholders are also seen as 
obstacles to a successful CBNRM (Fabricius & Collins 2007). Another issue is 
the misappropriation of funds and misappropriation of expected profit (Oyono 
2004; Mbaiwa 2004; Brockington 2008), which according to Oyono (2004) could 
be dealt with through the implementation of a monitoring system. 
Important elements of CBNRM for success are given in the literature as well. 
These are that policy, legislation and practice should be rooted in local needs 
(Jones & Weaver 2009) also because national level enforcement is more effective 
when it complements local institutions moral economy, for which reason a 
bottom-up approach is preferable according to Hutton et al (2005). This would be 
achieved through increased broad based participation in local public decision-
making, downwardly accountable and representative authorities (including, 
according to Ribot 2003, non-electoral accountability measures) with meaningful 
discretionary powers (Ribot 2003, 2004, 2006; Shackleton et al 2002; Campbell & 
Shackleton 2001). Participation in decision-making is important in order to 
mitigate the unequal power relation between the outsiders (i.e. NGO’s, scientists 
etc.) who develop the policies and the local population, and thereby negotiate and 
implement a form of hybrid (Blaikie 2006; see also Meshack 2006). Moreover, 
Fabricius and Collins (2007) suggest that for a successful participation formalised 
decision-making structures with clear constitutions and codes of conduct, and 
clearly defined, legitimised conflict resolution procedures is needed. Sufficient 
powers and authority must, according to the literature, be devolved to the local 
level (Jones & Weaver 2009; Ribot 2003; Campbell & Shackleton 2001; Nelson 
& Agrawal 2008; Oyono 2004; Nunan 2006; Sebele 2010; Brockington 2008; 
Virtanen 2003). Shackleton et al (2002) goes further and argue that transferring 
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authority directly to disadvantaged people tends to be more responsive to local 
needs, than those that allocate control to higher levels of social organisations, such 
as local government. Related to success factors transparency and accountability, is 
a low level of corruption and a functioning rule of law at a national and local 
level, which is also by i.e. Oyono (2004) and Nelson and Agrawal (2008) seen as 
beneficiary for a successful CBNRM programme. Ribot (2004) emphasise the 
need for appropriate electoral codes and laws that transfer executive, legislative 
and judicial powers.  
The role of traditional authorities is discussed briefly in some of the literature. 
Fabricius and Collins (2007) write that governance structure must be legitimised 
and accepted by traditional authorities as well as community members etc. thus 
giving them a role as a stakeholder. Campbell and Shackleton (2001) argue, 
similarly, that it is vital to recognise the importance of traditional leaders. 
Commitment from national- and local level politicians is needed in order for 
CBNRM to succeed (Boudreaux & Nelson 2011; Andersson et al 2004; Sebele 
2010). But commitment is not enough; at the local level capacity building, 
training in managerial skills, and building an understanding of what CBNRM 
actually is, is needed (Mbaiwa 2004). According to Andersson et al (2004) 
sufficient regulatory powers are required for local politicians’ to invest their time 
and resources into CBNRM activities, since only if they reap political and/or 
financial rewards from doing so, will they participate actively in a decentralised 
NRM policy. However, one can argue that financial benefits as an incentive to 
decentralise is just as much an incentive not to. The financial value of the natural 
resources when directly controlled by the state and carried out on community 
lands amplifies incentives to maintain control and to resist devolutionary reforms 
(Nelson & Agrawal 2008). The outcome of CBNRM is, again, strongly 
conditioned by the institutional incentives facing political decision-makers 
(Nelson & Agrawal 2008).  
Incentives are needed for the locals as well; they too need incentives such as 
socio-economic benefits to get involved and be truly committed to the programme 
(Sebele 2010; Nunan 2006; Thakadu 2005; Hutton et al 2005; Mbaiwa 2004; 
Measham & Lumbasi 2013), and it is especially important that the benefits 
outweigh the many costs related to the programme (Thakadu 2005; Sebele 2010; 
Virtanen 2003; Meshack 2006). An equal distribution of the benefits is therefore 
of great importance (Thakadu 2005; Virtanen 2003; Meshack 2006) as it could 
contribute to a greater acceptance of the programme by showing that the benefits 
outweigh the locals costs. Consequently, the immediate needs at the village levels, 
such as poverty alleviation, empowerment, security etc. must be addressed. 
(Thakadu 2005; Nunan 2006)  
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In addition to the literature of a more evaluative nature, there is an extensive 
literature of frameworks, approaches and theories regarding NRM and common-
pool resources (CPR). Much of it concerns resource use and management 
institutions under the influence of markets, for instance there is a wider agreement 
that increasing integration with markets usually has an unfavourable impact on the 
management of CPR, especially when roads begin to integrate distance resource 
systems and their users with other users and markets, as subsistence users are 
likely to increase levels of harvesting since they can now exploit natural resources 
for cash income as well (Chomitz, 1995; Young, 1994 in Agrawal 2001). Yet, the 
majority of research concerns the role of the state and overarching governance 
structure, as this is considered central in the functioning of CPR (Agrawal 2001 
p1656). For example, Clement (2010) develop a framework that highlight the 
need to simultaneously consider institutions, the politico-economic context and 
discourses across governance and government levels, and draws attention to the 
Table 2: Summary: Elements of success and failure in previous literature 
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role of power distribution at multiple levels in institutional design and 
performance. Blomquist et al (2010) framework focuses on the process by which 
institutional arrangements have come about and might change further. Bartley et 
al (2008) develop an “institutional mediation” approach in which they emphasise 
the “nestedness” of rules and highlights the role of institutional incentives, 
contradictions and complementarities in shaping how actors navigate 
decentralisation reforms. 
  
 
 
4.2 Perspective I: self-organising CPR’s 
The perspective in “Governing the commons” (1990) challenges models that are 
representations of theory of collective action. These are for instance “the 
prisoner’s dilemma game”, “the tragedy of the commons” and “the logic of 
collective action”, and that most commonly influence policy analysts in focusing 
either on centralisation – suggesting increased central control – or privatisation – 
proposed by those believing that too many regulations are the problem (Ostrom 
1990 p 2ff). Ostrom, however, opposes centralisation as well as privatisation in 
the models of collective action and creates an alternative solution, arguing that 
neither the government, nor the market, can exclusively create structures for a 
long term, sustainable management of common-pool resources (CPR). She 
presents a game in which the citizens – in her example herders – themselves can 
make a binding contract to commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they, 
themselves, will set up where the appropriators equally share the usage and costs 
of the natural resources (Ostrom 1990 p 15). They in addition need a private agent 
that take on the role of enforcer, who searches for methods to settle differences. 
The monitoring of making sure the rules are being followed will then be taken 
over by the appropriators themselves, avoiding any principal-agent problems with 
the enforcer. (Ostrom 1990 p 16) This fifth game is used as a different way to 
think about the mechanisms that individuals may use extricate themselves from 
common dilemmas (p 18).  
The study is based on a CPR situation that occurs when appropriators (defined 
as providers and producers) have mutual interests in common-pool resources 
(defined as resource systems and resource units). This leads to many CPR 
problems such as appropriators facing temptations to free-ride, shirk or otherwise 
act opportunistically, and many decisions have to be made to overcome them. 
These decisions are based on benefits and costs and therefore contain much 
uncertainty like lack of knowledge, the resource system, external effects such as a 
rainfall etc. If there are strong norms against opportunistic behaviour, the 
appropriator will be less wary of the danger of opportunism. These norms not only 
constrain the CPR problems, but can also serve as cost reducing of monitoring and 
sanctioning. (Ostrom 1990 p 33) 
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Returning to the previous discussion on success and failure, the success of the 
appropriators depends on the capabilities to solve individual and collective 
problems. 
It also shows what factors will increase the initial likelihood of self-
organisation, enhance the capabilities of individuals to continue self-organised 
efforts over time, or exceed the capacity of self-organisation to solve CPR 
problems without external assistance. (Ostrom 1990 p 29) The good solutions to 
overexploitation and resource management thus do not come from “outside”.  
Based on her field studies, she creates a list consisting of eight criteria with 
design principles for long-enduring CPR institutions (Table 3).  
 
These design principles constitute the foundation for her framework that she 
create, where she points out what variables in the internal and external world of 
institutional choice should be examined to understand the process of institutional 
collective action and changes in rules. The rules in the CPR situation differ from 
laws and national regulation. In the CPR situation, “rules provide stability of 
expectations, and efforts to change rules can rapidly reduce that stability” (Ostrom 
1990 p 53f). An absence of national rules and laws does not mean that there are 
no rules at the local level; local appropriators may develop working rules over 
time, which may lead to effective and sustainable management of resources, and 
affect what strategies appropriators believe is available to them and the result 
outcomes (Ostrom 1990 p 55). 
 
Table 3: Ostrom’s (1990 p 90) design principles for long-enduring CPR institutions 
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4.2.1 The process of institutional action and changes in rules 
 
In Figure 3, first column, Ostrom’s (1990 p 185ff) criteria for credible 
commitment to follow rules are outlined, as well as criteria for commitment to 
follow these rules. The strategy rests on the idea that “where individuals follow 
rules and engage in mutual monitoring, reinforcing institutional arrangements and 
individual strategies bolster one another so as to maintain enduring patterns of 
consistent, but not perfect, rule-following behaviour” (Ostrom 1990 p 187).  
This however does not explain how some appropriators overcome and others 
do not overcome collective provision of new rules. Ostrom (1990) departs from 
the existing theories that are focusing on internal variables influencing the 
institutional-choice situation, which are expected benefits, internal norms and 
discount rate, and expected costs. She then adds external variables (see Table 4 
text in bold) to these. These variables must be included in any attempt to explain 
and predict when appropriators using small-scale CPRs are more likely to self-
organise and effectively govern their own CPRs, and when they are more likely to 
fail. The CPR situation mainly has two possibilities: to change the rules or to keep 
them.   
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Before the change of rules each individual seeks answers to the questions 
“how will the value of the resource change?”, “how variable is the flow of 
resources?”, “which differences in quality will occur?”, “how will the resource 
system regenerate?” and “will there be more, same or less conflicts after the 
change of rules?” (Ostrom 1990 p 196). The situational variables in Table 4 (non-
bold variables) affect the answers to those questions, and will in turn affect 
whether the individual will see the change in rules as profitable or not.  
Variables (see Table 4) for the information about the cost of a change in rules 
also affect the decision. “If the appropriators can profit from a change in rules, the 
transformation costs are expected to be lower. Monitoring and enforcement costs 
occur e.g. for courts or police to enforce rules, and so it must bring a higher 
benefit than expected without monitoring and enforcement” (Ostrom 1990 p 
 
Table 4: Variables most likely to affect decisions about continuing or changing rules (Ostrom 1990) 
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198ff). The weighting of benefits and costs, are then found highly dependent on 
the norms.  
Despite criticising increased control by the government, Ostrom (1990 p 
212ff) acknowledge that indifferent and facilitative regimes can have different 
effects on the likelihood that appropriators will adopt new rules and enhance joint 
outcomes. It can make a substantial difference whether the local appropriators can 
supply their own institutions, or whether they are dependent on external 
authorities to solve their problems (Ibid). Although a facilitating government may 
be advantageous, an indifferent government to CPRs in remote areas are still 
perfectly able to succeed under certain conditions. The role and result of the 
government can therefore be said to differ, but a too facilitating government 
imposing uniform rules throughout a jurisdiction (which is likely) rather than 
specialised rules applying to localities within a jurisdiction makes CPRs less 
likely to succeed (Ostrom 1990 p 214). Similarly, a too controlling government 
leaving individuals without self-organising and self-governing authority are stuck 
where their problems are given to them and the best they can do is adopt strategies 
within the bounds that are given to them (Ostrom 1990 p 54). Hence, the process 
of CPR starts in different places; the government need to let go of the power to 
manage natural resources for the local level. The process is after that only 
concerned with the local level, and their development towards managing their 
own natural resources. The process towards successful CPRs could be illustrated 
the following way (see Figure 3). 
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In conclusion, Ostrom argue that in smaller contexts, the participants should be 
able and are better at establish their own rules under which they can manage their 
resources. This is due to the fact that no rules can work everywhere, but have to 
be fitted to local conditions. “Individuals follow rules and engage in mutual 
monitoring, reinforcing institutional arrangements and individual strategies bolster 
one another so as to maintain enduring patterns of consistent, but not perfect, rule-
Figure 3: Process towards institutional change and self-government 
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following behaviour” (Ostrom 1990 p 187). When individuals will find it 
advantageous, credible and safe to commit to rule compliance and mutual 
monitoring depends on internal and external variables to overcome the problems 
of collective provision of new rules. Thusly, if collective action can be achieved, 
it will be more effective and increase the returns from the appropriation efforts.  
 
4.3 Perspective II: traditional governance  
In this perspective, democracy can be seen as an idea that has been reduced from 
the substantive to the procedural, thus making it a “small idea” not very likely to 
bring with it an improvement of the human condition (Comaroff & Comaroff 
2012). The politics, according to this perspective, is moving elsewhere i.e. to 
global processes and institutions, into the corporate world, NGO’s etc. The export 
of modernist Euro-American models to the global south is in their view 
problematic, especially since Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) argue that African 
cultures have their own theories and practices of politics, personhood, power and 
representation. Cultural transitivity of the concept “democracy” should not be 
presumed in the way it is today. They argue that African countries are given the 
option to choose between an un-African political order in which “autonomous, 
individualized, rights-bearing citizens whose primary political being is congealed 
in the exercise of the ballot” and an “indigenous” order “usually characterized as 
anti-modern, ethnically based, patriarchal, traditionalist, customary, communalist, 
clientalist, and authoritarian – and/or, more insidiously yet, populist”. (Comaroff 
& Comaroff 2012 p 113) 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) conduct a case study in which they use a 
Botswanan chiefdom – the Tswana people – to explain that they traditionally, 
themselves, put great emphasis on what we would call “good governance”. The 
chiefs in the traditional society were responsible for all aspects of the collective 
well being and everything in the public domain – political, judicial, 
administrative, material and spiritual. (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 116ff) The 
authors also explain why Botswana experienced issues implementing and making 
the “Western” institutions part of the society: the national elections that were held, 
were to the people in the chiefdom seen as procedural democracy based on 
periodical voting, threatening to confine public involvement to every five years, in 
comparison to their own substantive ideologies of sovereign authority, legitimacy 
and accountability where politics is everyday life (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 
128ff). Thus, a more indigenously rooted version of democracy than the liberal 
“Euro-American” version might be needed. The authors make this case for 
Botswana, the country they studied most intensively, and argue that “democracy” 
has to become context specific: they criticise the taken-for-granted western 
political practices and institutions and argue that the critique that arose in the 
Botswana context “spoke of a specifically African alternative, one that demanded 
not less popular sovereignty but more, not less accountability but more, not just 
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choice but a public culture of criticism. All of which the global north has been 
moving steadily away from in recent times” (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 130).  
Both of the alternative perspectives thus depart at the same level in their 
analyses. They also put great faith on locals’ ability to manage themselves – either 
through self-organising units, or through traditional societies and their indigenous 
structures. The institutions could, from these perspectives, be created by the locals 
on the locals’ own terms, or are in some places already in place. Both perspectives 
seem to be reactions to the idea that all institutions need to be implemented by the 
state.   
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5 Changing theoretical perspectives 
To examine the research questions, the chapter begins with a discussion on the 
Western perspective as a paradigm resting on a common theoretical ground. 
Thereafter, I will discuss success of CBNRM from the different perspectives, 
followed by a discussion of the influence of policy, governance, power and 
context on the perception of success. 
5.1 The Western perspective – a common theoretical 
ground  
Drawing on what the previous literature on CBNRM perceive as non-favourable 
elements for the programme’s success, and what elements are important for 
success, some findings must be given attention. Firstly, the magnitude of the 
concept CBNRM becomes clear when dimensions like conservation, 
democratisation, poverty alleviation and economic development – which are all in 
themselves major fields – now are being squeezed into one single concept. 
Conservational interests are often conflicting with those of economic development 
when for instance bio-diversity has to compromise with the forest sector. 
Evidently, the many dimensions of the concept are making the actions of 
theorising and practice of CBNRM very difficult to handle.  
Scrutinising the earlier literature on the subject, it is evident that there are 
certain thinking patterns for how to deal with the field, and one can therefore 
argue that a version of Kuhn’s (1970) paradigm does in fact exist. The focus in the 
literature has so far primarily been on democratic decentralisation and on building 
institutions top down (see table 1 for summary). Downwardly accountable 
institutions, transparency, functioning rule of law, devolved powers etc. are by all 
authors suggested important to make the programmes more successful (or the lack 
of these elements are seen as non-favourable elements). CBNRM is a sort of 
decentralisation of NRM that can be defined as “any political act in which a 
central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot 2004 p 9). It is 
therefore, of course, in the nature of decentralisation to take place downwards 
from the top. Despite promoting the need for capacity building, and training in the 
concept at a local level – these are all reforms that should be made by central 
authorities. There is little emphasis on context – apart from some recognition of 
the traditional leaders’ importance – and this in turn gives the impression of an 
implicit advocacy of standardisation and blueprint solutions. This is true for 
almost every article, apart from Blaikie’s (2006) who explicitly argue against 
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“legislation and blueprinting”. The lack of context leads to another of the main 
issues with the current way of discussing CBNRM; that (Western) institutions are 
taken for granted. It is assumed that on both a national and a local level, 
institutions similar to ours are in place. It places so much emphasis on these 
institutions, that without them in place, success simply cannot be achieved. Much 
of the criticism towards the programme is regarding the (mal-)functioning of  
these institutions, and many of the issues following the previous literature lies in 
the institutions. 
Many authors suggest a bottom-up approach as a solution to reach success 
where policy, legislation and practice are rooted in local needs through the locals’ 
participation in decision-making. At the same time, however, they are still relying 
on Western models of governance. 
The noted paradigm in the research on CBNRM has the consequence that very 
few initiatives are seen as successful because of the inherent issues in basing the 
discussions on Western democratic decentralisation that is not rooted in the 
African context. The previous research, thus, rests on a common theoretical 
ground, which is problematic since the “failures” of the programmes are perceived 
as failures because of the paradigm. It is therefore of interest to explore different 
perspectives that can contribute to the knowledge and understanding of CBNRM.  
 
 
5.2 Success of CBNRM from different perspectives 
When previous research describes CBNRM, the choice of word is noteworthy: it 
is regularly described as a “failure”. Some authors (i.e. Blaikie 2006) argue that 
CBNRM is in fact failing and therefore should be abandoned for other ideas. 
Others seem to think of it as, despite referring to it as a failure, something that is 
in fact unsuccessful but with some reforms can be made successful. If looked 
upon from a steering perspective, where “the steering of structuring, for example, 
can be oriented towards the creation of an already existing unit, the move of a unit 
to another department, or the restructuring of a unit” (Lundquist 1987 p 159) the 
“failure” of CBNRM could be regarded as an implementation deviation – that 
with some fine-tuning – can be corrected. For the selection of articles I chose 
some African authors to see whether their handling and evaluation of the CBNRM 
programmes differed from that of Western authors. Perhaps not very surprising it 
did not differ significantly, probably since they use Western perspectives for their 
discussions, and in general are highly influenced by other Western universities. In 
this respect however, the latter way of thinking about CBNRM (as something that 
can be corrected) seems to be more prominent among the African authors. 
Although acknowledging issues within the programmes, their case studies are 
more often sided by optimism for the future of CBNRM and a “how can we move 
forward with what we have-attitude”. The usage of “failure” is highly related to 
the concept “success”, and it is notable that many authors regard programmes not 
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achieving the main objectives of CBNRM as failures, and to a large extent 
therefore ignores the “smaller” successes and objectives that have been 
accomplished such as increased (if only little) autonomy in decision-making. In 
the chain of steering (Lundquist 1987 p 170) Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2012) are placed somewhere else, and cannot be regarded as a 
deviation therein. The perspectives they offer are different, which in this context 
may be beneficial. 
  As argued in section 4.1.1, successful management according to the previous 
research includes local management, local economic development and sustainable 
management of the natural resources. Interestingly, only a very few authors depart 
from the country’s programme objectives that are given as an example in their 
article, and evaluate their outcome to see whether it is delivering the goals set up. 
This could partly be a result of a lack of monitoring of the programme, which is 
very costly and difficult and would require an additional evaluation. Despite this, I 
believe the most essential reason for using a general objective instead of the 
country’s, is the literature’s tendency to exclude the context and deny the 
complexity and diversity of the programmes. Most importantly, no attention is 
explicitly given to how institution building needs to take place. Given this, there 
ought to be many ways to achieve success.  
Many CBNRM programmes are in progress, and based on these programmes 
one can argue that they from Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) 
perspectives can be regarded as relatively successful at the very basic level since 
the programmes do in fact give the locals more freedom to decide over the natural 
resource management, and in some places (i.e. central Africa (Binot et al 2009 p 
23)) allow them to base their communities on traditional structures.   
A successful CPR is according to Ostrom (1990 p 15) “institutions that enable 
individuals to achieve productive outcomes in situations where temptations to 
free-ride and shirk are ever present”. The perspective proposed by Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2012) does not have an explicit definition of what success is, probably 
since it is not concerned with NRM in particular. The standpoint is more of an 
argumentation against the Euro-American democracy, and towards a model more 
inclusive of traditional African structures. It is therefore difficult to say whether 
the CBNRM programme can be seen as successful from this perspective, other 
than whether it is based on traditional structures or not.  
In general, institutions that enable individuals to achieve productive outcomes 
in situations where temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present, are 
somewhat in place. The institutions put in place according to the Western 
perspective, might in some places indeed hinder temptations to free-ride and 
shirk. The question, though, is how productive these systems are. The many 
problems in CBNRM today indicate that they are not particularly productive. 
Correspondingly, traditional African societies are incorporated into – although in 
varying degree – CBNRM programmes. However, most often this incorporation is 
not working but are rather characterised by complex and conflicting mandates 
(Campbell & Shackleton 2001 p 100). CBNRM can thus not be seen as entirely 
successful from either of these alternative perspectives in general terms. This 
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however, does not mean that there cannot be elements of success in the 
programmes: 
Departing from Ostrom’s (1990 p 90) eight design principles for long-
enduring CPR institutions, some of the principles are already in place. The 
boundaries for what rights individuals and households have to the resource and 
the boundaries of the CPR itself is defined, and on a superficial level in some 
places there is a congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions and most appropriators affected by the operational rules can participate 
in changing them as well. The communities are also relatively free to run their 
own institutions, and are monitored. (Ostrom 1990 p 90ff) This will be illustrated 
in the following sections that will provide a deeper understanding of the 
programmes.   
Consequently, taking all of the above into account, if the theory component is 
replaced with another perspective the policy- and normative recommendations 
will be different. The question that follows then is how Ostrom (1990) and 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) can contribute to CBNRM.  
 
 
5.2.1 The influence of policy and governance 
Local bodies are, according to the Western perspective, meant to constitute 
democratic, downwardly accountable local authorities that have been 
implemented from the top. Already at this level in the Western perspective many 
problems, as previously mentioned, have occurred where institutions have been 
created from above, without any local ties. Many of the elements for success and 
failure at the local level are in the hands of the government, in particular the 
national one. Meaningful discretionary powers devolved to the local level, 
functioning rule of law with appropriate electoral codes and laws transferring 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, formalised decision-making structures 
with clear constitutions and codes of conduct between local and national level, 
and clearly defined and legitimised conflict resolution procedures between the two 
levels are all emphasising the need for a committed national level government. As 
has been illustrated in the case studies and evaluations of CBNRM programmes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the central authorities are for several reasons rarely this 
committed to the programme, thus actively or passively letting it fail. Given the 
Western perspective’s predilection for blueprinting and emphasis of central 
authorities, the needs specific to the local context are often sidelined. If, instead of 
using a standardised model from the West where the top level is absolutely 
decisive of the success or failure of a CBNRM programme, hence incapacitating 
both the nation in creating their own institutions, and the locals by making it 
something that needs to be steered from above, we could shift the perspective 
downwards to a local level where, under the right circumstances, common-pool 
problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a 
coercive state.  
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The role of the state would still be prominent, as it could act as a hindrance for 
successful local CPR governance in not giving participants (i.e. locals) the 
autonomy to change their own institutional structures. The central government 
might even prevent participants from making constructive changes, and groups 
could also suffer from non-beneficial incentive systems that are themselves the 
results of central government policies. (Ostrom 1990 p 20f) These problems are of 
course similar to the ones in the Western perspective, however, as Ostrom (1990 p 
21) assert, “as long as analysts presume that individuals cannot change such 
situations themselves, they do not ask what internal or external variables can 
enhance or impede the efforts of communities of individuals to deal creatively and 
constructively with perverse problems such as the tragedy of the commons”. 
Moreover, the emphasis put on the central government is much less then in the 
Western perspective, making these perspectives less susceptible to corrupt central 
government, or non-functioning governments in general. There is of course a 
similar risk with traditional authorities where leaders have been corrupt, and even 
agents for the previous regimes (e.g. Fish River, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) (Campbell 
& Shackleton 2001 p 99). 
Ostrom (1990) and the Western perspective thus depart at the same level in the 
process towards successful local management – the role of the central state. 
Ostrom (1990 p 210ff) also consider the type of external political regime under 
which the CPR is operated. From there, the two perspectives take different paths, 
where the Western perspective continue the emphasis on state involvement in 
creating institutions for the locals, and Ostrom (1990) emphasise the ability of 
locals to self-organise. Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) in turn stress that there is 
an African alternative to the Western perspective, yet for it to function in CBNRM 
today, it too needs to be given a possibility to govern and implement its own 
policies.  
To a certain extent, this can be said to be the case in for example Namibia 
(that is also often seen as a more successful example in CBNRM from the 
Western perspective). Here the communities are free to set their own boundaries 
for their communities and the members have the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making. They are fairly free to run their institutions and the 
appropriation rules are somewhat related to the local conditions. The institutions 
however are not “their own” and the programmes can therefore only be relatively 
successful, and this only at a very superficial level. The so called “local 
convention” in West Africa is frequently implemented as part of CBNRM, and 
can be defined as “agreements, written or oral, negotiated between two or more 
groups of actors, defining management and use rules for land and/or natural 
resources found in a given area” (Binot et al 2009 p 44), and the convention does 
not have to involve any state actors. This West African case proves that even 
within current structures it is possible for locals to develop rules and avoid 
conflict without state institutions (although this method has had mixed results).  
In Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) example on how traditional authorities 
have their own type of “good governance”, the chiefs of the Tswana chiefdom 
were responsible for all aspects – political, judicial, administrative, material, 
spiritual – of the collective well-being. The rural ideology of good government 
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was less concerned with the content of the public affairs than with the means by 
which they were managed, as the responsibility of the sovereign “embraced the 
fluid responsibilities of time, space and situation”. (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 
117ff) Chiefs were expected to rule with the people, and aspects like participation 
and the consultative aspect of the public sphere, the proportional relationship 
between the performance of any ruler and his legitimacy, as well as the fusion 
between civil society and the state were stressed as important in the chiefdom. 
The chiefs held regular meetings of councils of headmen, summoned public 
assemblies from which policies emerged reflecting the public views, they ensured 
that the hierarchy of courts did not favour rich over poor and royals over 
commons etc and they redistributed food and other requisites in times of need. 
Some chiefdoms’ rulers were even recalled by the legislation they introduced. 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 118f) Comaroff and Comaroff (2012 p 118ff) 
argue that the success of the chief was numbered in the amount of observable 
achievements like improvements. These improvements however, hinged on the 
cooperation of the people, which in turn hinged on the degree to which he was 
seen to measure up to the publics’ ideal of good governance. Public meetings 
were not only meant for consultation, but also served as forums where the rulers 
were subjected to debate and evaluation. There, in addition to this, existed an 
incremental scale of sovereign authority, in which the rulers rights to regulate the 
instruments and institutions of governance became more inclusive (and exclusive) 
as the legitimacy of the ruler increased. (Ibid) 
 
5.2.2 The influence of power 
Given that the state is less central in the perspectives by Ostrom (1990) and 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2012), one of the many problems with a high level of 
state authority control is avoided: for example, in most places local hunting quotas 
are established by national wildlife authorities, government institutions are in 
charge of financial accounting and receive a major share of the income generated 
from wildlife. Yet, one cannot necessarily assume that the state is a homogenous 
entity with one internally consistent set of goals, and the above – current – 
arrangement therefore becomes problematic. In countries such as Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, access and use of natural resources like wildlife and agricultural land 
was turned into a controversial political issue, resulting in a reform standstill in 
Zambia, and contradictory development and conservation policies in Zimbabwe. 
(Virtanen 2003 p 182) If the locals would gain more control over resources and be 
able to self-organise to manage them, this could be avoided. In the current 
CBNRM programmes, access is given to actors based on certain rights, whereas 
control is vested in political-legal institutions (Virtanen 2003 p 182), so for this to 
be possible, the actual control over the resources must be moved to the local level. 
In what the “local level” and “communities” should be based must then be 
established.  
  37 
In many Sub-Saharan African countries, the communities have not been 
created by themselves but by authorities, and for this reason natural resource 
boundaries and local territorial boundaries often do not coincide (Blaikie 2006 p 
1953). Blaikie (2006 p 1953) inquire “to whom do the wildlife of the Kalahari or 
the fish of Lake Malawi, which both migrate across territorial community 
boundaries, belong, and whose responsibility are they?” and further argue that 
without an understanding of the existing management arrangements, inept 
attempts to territorialise common property jurisdictions often are made. This is 
however not the case in Namibia, where communities themselves create 
management units that they then register with authorities (NACSO). Ostrom 
(1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) are much relevant in this case: 
Namibian communities are self-created entities, relatively small in size, the 
appropriators live near the CPR, and they are involved in many situations 
together. Many of the communities in Namibia have grown out of traditional 
villages where traditional leaders still play an important role in the community. If 
CBNRM was to base the communities in existing ones, where norms and 
practices are already in place, it might become more successful.  
Villages in Central Africa illustrate how the traditional rulers still play an 
important role, and how old village rules prohibit certain areas and/or species 
from being harvested, with the village chief working as the enforcer of these rules 
(together with magic). Similarly, in West Africa the traditional leaders have 
administrative rights over the community land, and often the use of specific 
resources is forbidden within the community. The systems of tenure and use often 
exist for specific natural resources such as fishing systems and, for example, the 
“master of water” in Mali. Some of these traditional societies have persisted even 
though the government has imposed rules – leading to new power structures – on 
them. (Binot et al 2009 p 23f) Despite the presence of traditional chiefdoms, their 
actual possibilities for impact are limited: Murphree and Taylor (2009 p 109) note 
that  “their tenure rights are weak and they have no clear rights to the 
economically valuable resources which were historically theirs. They lack the 
security required as an inducement for conservation investments in the future. 
Regulations preclude the opportunity for them to experiment with the use of their 
resources”. 
Despite the lack of actual power devolved to traditional authorities in West- 
and Central Africa, they were given a relatively large amount of power in 
Zambia’s ADMADE programme: traditional authorities were given a prominent 
role in the local wildlife management authorities, and although most technical and 
capital input were directed through government channels, the traditional chiefs in 
fact control the funds. Still, Virtanen (2003 p 186) does not see this as a sole 
solution to the problem of local representation, since some headmen misused their 
authority to for example secure more power and resources for themselves (Ibid, 
Sebele 2010 p 143). However, Virtanen (2003) also derives this to the colonial 
rule, which made traditional authorities accountable more to the colonial 
administration, and thus compromised the existing accountability relations of the 
chiefs and elders downward to their communities. (Ibid) The colonial regime 
shifted the traditional authorities accountability upwards. Yet, as I argued earlier, 
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these “traditional authorities” are not necessarily traditional as such. A shift 
towards the more indigenous alternative should perhaps exclude these colonial 
versions and moreover, the fundaments of Ostrom’s (1990) framework ought to 
dampen the influences of autocratic leaders.  
 
5.2.3 The influence of context 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) argue that Africans have their own theories and 
practices of politics, personhood, power and representation, and therefore, the 
cultural transitivity of the concept “democracy” cannot be presumed. This is in 
line with what I have previously argued; the Western perspective uses Western 
values and put little consideration to the country specific environment. Exporting 
modernist Western models to different settings, attempting to put in place Western 
democratic institutions has proven difficult, as illustrated by this case. Often 
failing in the institutions set up by the West, which can be derived to the lack of 
context (see i.e. Comaroff & Comaroff 2012), a more indigenous alternative could 
be needed for the success of the CBNRM programmes. Although the local 
government systems might have changed over the years, and chiefs in the 
traditional societies have been denuded of much of their authority, many of the 
chiefdoms still exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The role of traditional leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa is somewhat debated in 
the decentralisation literature of today. The most common way of discussing 
(when discussing) the involvement of these leaders in the 
decentralisation/democratisation literature is that they should be taken into 
account in decentralisation undertakings. I however believe that context specific 
indigenous African structures may have more than that to offer for successful 
governance in decentralisation and CBNRM programmes. Indigenous ruling 
structures, that have previously worked in their specific context, are often 
dismissed as “anti-modern, ethnically based, patriarchal, traditionalist, customary, 
communalist, clientalist, and authoritarian – and/or, more insidiously yet, 
populist” (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 113) and countries are for this reason left 
with the option of adopting an highly un-African political order “wherein the body 
politic is composed of autonomous, individualised, rights-bearing citizens whose 
primary political being is congealed in the exercise of the ballot” (Ibid). The 
African context thus differs from the one the CBNRM programmes are based on. 
This can for example be illustrated by the initiation of CBNRM in Botswana 
where the indigenous alternatives – successfully – were given a larger role, yet 
this was only during the mobilisation phase: during the start-up of the programme, 
officials requested deliberations on the matter in the traditional kgotla meetings. 
The reason for this was that the kgotla is seen as democratic, and the people’s 
voices could be heard for consultations for the implementation of the programme 
(Thakadu 2005 p 200). Nevertheless, the kgotla was mainly used during the 
mobilisation face, and in the actual programme it is primarily used as a way to 
give an annual report, and to every second year elect board members (Sebele 2010 
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p 142). Due to the kgotla protocol, Thakadu (2005 p 204f) argue, it was difficult 
to use this forum for participatory decision-making since government officials are 
not allowed presiding over a meeting – this being the headmen’s role – their role 
was limited to making a presentation and clarifying the specific matters under 
discussion. This serves as an example where the Western institutions did not work 
together with the indigenous, and so more methods of CBNRM could be found 
within the traditional society to avoid clashes between context and standardised 
models.  
As has been established earlier, norms are of great importance according to 
Ostrom (1990). Using one of her variables – “transaction costs” – as an 
illustration, the norms that the individuals share concerning appropriate strategies 
when engaging in collective choice will affect transformation costs directly and 
indirectly:  
 
“when individuals adopt confrontational strategies, for example, transformation 
costs rise sharply (…). When some individuals fear that others will attempt to 
organize minimal winning coalitions to impose costs on losers, that will affect 
their willingness to adopt changes that would reduce the inclusiveness of the rules 
to be used in the future. Thus, appropriators who share norms that restrain 
opportunistic behaviour can adopt rules that are less costly to operate than are 
the rules adopted by appropriators who do not share such norms”.  
(Ostrom 1990 p 200) 
 
Similarly, Comaroff and Comaroff (2012 p 116) argue, “while chiefdoms varied 
in size and in the minutiae of their institutional arrangement, the dominant 
features of their political organisation, cultures, and ideology were broadly 
shared”. In many places, for instance Botswana, much of the citizenry was raised 
in the traditional society (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p 116), it is therefore also 
reasonable to believe that the chiefdoms not only share features between the 
chiefdoms, but that they share norms within them as well. On this account, shared 
norms are already in place that would restrain opportunistic behaviour. These 
norms have been developed over time within that particular group, so in order to 
take advantage of these existing norms, the communities in CBNRM might 
benefit from being based in indigenous groups. Although not particularly 
successful in Zambia, there is evidence that within the indigenous societies, there 
is a great emphasis on what could be referred to as  “good governance”. 
The problem of sometimes combining Western models with indigenous ones 
could partially be explained through, as Ostrom (1990 p 184) argue, that the 
norms and the institutional capital have been destroyed because of the rules that 
have been imposed on them. “In a small-scale CPR people interact and 
communicate with each other, and they can therefore learn whom to trust, the 
effects of their actions on one another as well as the CPR, and how to organise 
themselves to gain benefits and avoid harm. When individuals have lived in such 
a situation for some time, and have developed shared norms and patterns of 
reciprocity, they posses social capital with which they can build institutional 
arrangements for resolving CPR dilemmas” (Ostrom 1990 p 183f). A move back 
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to this institutional capital based on shared norms could therefore make the 
programmes more successful and even erase some of the present issues, such as 
corruption, misappropriation, weak system for social control, lack of community 
involvement, and elite capture. Likewise, this could possibly be one reason for 
why the “local convention” in Central Africa has received mixed results, and why 
some traditional systems did not persist the new government systems. 
Considering that the many issues in the present way of dealing with CBNRM 
can be derived from a lack of cultural understanding and an underestimation of 
the local people, it is useful to examine what Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2012) can contribute with to the understanding and development of 
theory and practice of CBNRM. 
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6 Conclusion 
The literature of CBNRM today, is mostly occupied with discussing reasons for 
why the programmes are failing. The way this is done is based on the same 
underlying assumption – where Western models are meant to be applicable in the 
Sub-Saharan African context as well. Given that none of the programmes are 
considered as entirely successful, one wonders whether the underlying assumption 
is flawed? And, how could we understand and develop CBNRM in alternative 
ways focusing on the success of the programme? 
It seems as though many of the issues following the previous literature lies in 
the institutions, which ought to mean that the real problem is that the African 
reality differs from the reality the models are/were made in. The flawed 
underlying assumption of the programme thus generates failure. A shift in 
theoretical perspectives that are more sensitive to the African reality could 
therefore increase the understanding of success in CBNRM. The perspectives that 
have been used in this study do just that. The perspective offered by Ostrom 
(1990) differs substantially in its way of dealing with CPR in comparison to the 
previous research’s way of dealing with CBNRM. Ostrom (1990) argue that 
resources can be managed through self-organising locals, whereas previous 
literature argues that locals through top-down implementation of institutions can 
manage resources – the locals cannot implement them on their own. The Western 
perspective is based on an idea of the ideal democracy exported from the West, 
and emphasises democratic governance. A different take on democratic 
governance is proposed by Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) perspective where 
the traditional structures and institutions are emphasised as an alternative way of 
local governance.  
Despite the considerable differences in the three perspectives’ way of dealing 
with NRM, the main definition of a successful CBNRM in previous literature can 
be used on all perspectives because of its width. It is therefore possible to develop 
CBNRM with these proposed perspectives. As argued, it is in the nature of 
decentralisation that it takes place top-down since the state normally holds the 
power and therefore must decide to devolve it to the local level. The previous 
literature’s critique against the lack of devolved power is thus of interest even 
when changing the theoretical perspectives, and likewise influence the potential 
success of a programme. It is however clear that from the perspectives of Ostrom 
(1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) many of the other elements that, 
according to the Western perspective, are needed for successful CBNRM, that in 
many places are not there and therefore making the programme a “failure”, are not 
considered as important from these two other perspectives. This is because 
Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) both depart from the idea that 
the people at the local level themselves can find ways of successful governance. 
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Yet, the programmes cannot be seen as particularly successful from the 
perspectives by Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) either, since 
the previous norms have been erased/oppressed due to the implementation of 
Western institutions. This is related to the great influence of donors (see i.e. 
Hutton et al 2005, Binot et al 2009) in the founding of CBNRM programmes 
since they are, as I have argued before, entrenched in Western decentralisation 
models. Although all of the models include some form of community 
involvement, the programmes are conceived abroad in collaboration with national 
government but disconnected from the local level (Binot et al 2009 p 23). 
Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012 p 128ff) explanation on why national elections 
did not work in Botswana proves this point: the elections were seen as procedural 
democracy instead of the traditional version where legitimacy, accountability etc. 
was part of the everyday life. One can therefore argue that the fundaments of the 
elements for success are in fact in place, but are hindered by ill-fitting Western 
institutions to develop further and become truly successful. Furthermore, given 
the many differencces between the three perspectives, it is not entirely surprising 
that CBNRM is not successful from Ostrom (1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff's 
(2012) perspectives either, especially since the programmes are created based on 
the Western perspective.  
The discussions on CBNRM are clearly in need of new perspectives in order 
to understand the success and/or failures of it. So how can it be developed to 
become more successful? 
Greater local influence on policy and governance could develop CBNRM to 
become more successful, since the central authorities are often not as committed 
to the programme as the locals. The locals in most environments rely on the 
natural resources for their livelihood, and therefore have mutual interests in the 
resources. If the problems related to the CPR can be overcome, which Ostrom 
(1990) prove they can under certain circumstances, the resources can be managed 
sustainably with less government commitment. Moreover, research show that 
some traditional authorities are devoted to “good governance”, yet models unable 
them to practice it. Despite the general opinion that traditional villages are corrupt 
etc. the rulers in the chiefdoms do not necessarily have an uncontested right to 
rule the people, but it is very much based on the actions of the ruler, who has to 
listen to the people (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012). It is therefore logical that the 
people have a reasonable amount of autonomy to change their own rules, which is 
important for CPR governance (Ostrom 1990 p 200). A highly centralised regime 
relies on the same operational rules in all locations within the territory (Ibid), 
which is one of the problems in countries’ CBNRM today but should not based on 
the findings of Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) be a problem in some traditional 
societies. Nor will, according to their perspective, the problems of a corrupt 
regime (Ostrom 1990 p 200) be as prominent if CBNRM are based in traditional 
villages, because of their accountability methods. Devolving power to the local 
level, could also develop CBNRM to become more successful especially since the 
villages (based in traditional authorities or not) already share norms and 
traditionally have various regulations that are followed even with regards to the 
natural resources, which is the fundament of Ostrom’s (1990) perspective. This 
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further indicates that boundaries for what resources belong to which village, are 
already set before the Western institutions came into place. Systems for the usage 
of natural resources thus exist; sometimes they are based in traditional societies, 
but examples exist were they function similar to Ostrom’s framework. The 
context proves important when Western institutions are applied to an African 
context. The Kgotla system is proof of this when the traditional system only 
worked in the initiation phase, but not during the actual programme because of the 
clash between the systems. The clash between the systems could also be the 
reason for why for example the traditional authorities did not work well in 
Zambia: they had been squeezed into a Western context (both by colonisers, but 
also in the implementation of CBNRM), and was not practising entirely according 
to its own model.  
This study emphasises the importance of context and local structures. In 
smaller contexts, the locals are better at establishing their own rules for managing 
their natural resources, since rules must be fitted to local conditions (Ostrom 
1990). For the development of CBNRM a shift is therefore needed where 
traditional leaders and/or structures (i.e. self-governing units) are not the ones 
“taken into account” in the Western perspective, but rather the other way around: 
traditional societies could possibly serve as a base and modern institutions be 
taken into account to function in a modern society? Locals should and may not be 
able to take over all decision-making powers, but they should be regarded as 
bigger stakeholders, and not only (which often the case with traditional leaders) as 
problems. Much of what is needed to make CBNRM successful departing from 
the Western perspective’s definition is already in place, if not according to 
Western implementation models, and it could therefore be beneficial to use these 
perspectives as a foundation for the further development of CBNRM programmes. 
For this to be possible, however, all variables proposed by Ostrom (1990) needs to 
be in place, which they are currently not. Thus, instead of developing CBNRM 
according to the Western model, on the basis of current discussions from the 
Western perspective, the development could focus on developing conditions for 
locals to create self-governing CPR units according to Ostrom’s (1990) 
perspective. Possibly, CBNRM should focus on creating these conditions instead 
of continuing building on democratic models according to the Western 
perspective.  
The question of whether new institutions should be created or existing 
institutions should be developed is complex. Some of the traditional structures and 
authorities have already been destructed by either colonisers or the new 
institutions imposed on them. The question is if it is fruitful to continue the 
destruction of traditions, or instead build upon them like in Zambia, or perhaps 
even “recreate” the traditional society. It seems to be clear that new ways of 
approaching CBNRM is needed.  
The study also raises an important question of a more general nature: if a 
system can in fact function on its own – then how can we justify an intervention? 
This does not only concern for example donors, but also the central authorities. If 
the locals can create their own systems, then why insist on intervening and 
changing them? 
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7 Reflections 
After changing the perspectives in the discussion on CBNRM, the main 
conclusion is that the local conditions needs to play a larger role in the 
development to become more successful. However, the study is mostly based on 
the analysis of existing literature. Given that the literature is based on the Western 
perspective, it only discusses information related to their perspective. It has 
therefore been especially difficult to find working examples of Ostrom’s (1990) 
perspective, and to some extent Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) as well.  We 
don’t know whether the conclusions hold in every context. It could be that 
Ostrom’s (1990) perspective is not suitable for all sorts of natural resources; 
wildlife for example, travel across boarders and it could therefore be more 
difficult to create long term management structures. On the other hand, the locals 
living among the animals are more likely to know their migration patterns and 
based on this knowledge could be better at creating management structures than 
central authorities. In some areas traditional authorities may work well to manage 
resources, and in some areas not. The case is the same for self-governing CPR 
units – it works well under certain circumstances. The most important lesson of 
this change of perspectives, is the importance of context when implementing 
programmes, and chances are it will look different depending on where it is 
implemented. This is not discussed in this study, and further research is thus 
needed in the area to see under what circumstances and in which contexts the 
perspectives work or not in CBNRM. More country specific information could 
have been of use, and field studies would in this respect have been advantageous. 
For future research, I believe that complementing in-depth studies are needed to 
know what the contribution of the perspectives could look like in practice. As a 
follow up on this study, field studies in different countries/contexts thus ought to 
be an interesting avenue for the exploration of contextual differences’ influence 
on success of CBNRM initiatives. This is not being researched to any greater 
extent in the previous literature. Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) have of course 
already proven that traditional authorities can be democratic, but what would it be 
like if they were to govern over natural resources as well?  
This study serves as an indication of the possibility that the Western 
perspective may not always work as intended, and that contextual adaptation may 
be necessary to succeed with such initiatives.  
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8 Executive summary 
The management of natural resources has been a challenge in developing 
countries for a long time. Since the 1980’s many Sub-Saharan African countries 
have decentralised their natural resource management to become more 
community-based. These decentralisation programmes, known as community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM), not only aims at managing the 
natural resources at the local level, but also to ensure that the locals can derive 
economic benefits from the resources they are managing. The present vast 
literature on the subject is mostly concerned with debating the perceived failures 
of the CBNRM programmes, which is done with the same underlying assumption 
as if the discussion concerned a Western country decentralising its natural 
resource management. Since the programme is mostly considered to be failing, 
and the discussion depart from a Western perspective, it leads to the question: 
 
• What if the underlying assumption is flawed? 
 
Since theories shape the results of the studies, the underlying assumptions might 
create the “failure”. Most of the studies are based on a top-down implementation 
perspective, but other perspectives on natural resource management from a 
grassroot’s perspective (Ostrom 1990) and democratic governance in traditional 
African structures (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012) exists. The question thus reads: 
 
• How could we understand and develop CBNRM in alternative ways 
taking grassroot levels and African structures into account? 
 
Because underlying assumptions could affect perceptions of success, particular 
attention is paid to the various perspectives of success, with special focus on the 
influences of policy and governance, power and context. The purpose of the study 
is to analyse CBNRM from different perspectives and increase our understanding 
of the success and/or failure of such programmes.  
The main method of the study is the literature review, which consisted of 25 
selected articles based on results in a general search of articles in the field, and 
citation-based searches in order to uncover the most influential work that shape 
the literature in CBNRM. The review revealed that the previous research could be 
seen as a sort of paradigm, where the main focus is on building institutions top-
down. This perspective is referred to as “the Western perspective” and places the 
elements for success and failure at the local level in the hands of the government, 
in particular the national one. Meaningful discretionary powers devolved to the 
local level, functioning rule of law with appropriate electoral codes and laws 
transferring executive, legislative and judicial powers, formalised decision-
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making structures with clear constitutions and codes of conduct between local and 
national level, and clearly defined and legitimised conflict resolution procedures 
between the two levels are all emphasising the need for a committed natural level 
government. The Western perspective’s definition of success departed from a 
wide and general objective. Despite formulating it in different ways, the core 
values of the definitions of a successful CBNRM were the same: local 
management, local economic development and sustainable management of the 
natural resources.  
The alternative perspective by Ostrom (1990) depart from the idea that 
citizens themselves can make a binding contract to commit themselves to a 
cooperative strategy that they, themselves, will set up and where the appropriators 
equally share the usage and costs of the natural resources (1990 p 15). The other 
perspective by Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) emphasises the African alternative 
to the exported institutions, which can be just as democratic if not more (2012 p 
130). 
In the analysis of the Western perspective it becomes clear that the literature 
assumes that Western institutions are in place. Without these in place, CBNRM 
cannot become successful. Due to this assumption, very few CBNRM 
programmes are regarded as successful. 
When discussing success from the alternative perspectives by Ostrom (1990) 
and Comaroff and Comaroff (1990), the programmes cannot be seen as 
particularly successful in general either, yet many elements needed for the success 
of CBNRM are there. These are however hindered by ill-fitting Western 
institutions. The influence of policy and governance on success is evident. The 
central authorities still plays a large role when changing perspectives to Ostrom 
(1990) and Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) since the central authorities could 
act as a hindrance of letting the locals self-manage the resources. The study also 
illustrate that there are cases where locals do manage its own resources through 
for instance traditional authorities, and that the way some traditional authorities 
govern, can be characterised as “good governance”. Traditionally, there is often a 
system for the management on resources, as well as punishment for the ones not 
following it. Most often, these do not coincide with the systems put in place based 
on Western models and the outcome is therefore not successful. If citizens are 
given more power they can set up their own structures working in their context.  
The conclusion of the study is that the perspective in use, where Western 
institutions play a great role, creates many of the problems as the context of where 
it is formed differs from where it is being implemented. Shifting the perspective to 
more culturally sensitive ones is therefore important to increase the understanding 
and to further develop the CBNRM programmes. Despite the considerable 
differences in the three perspectives’ way of dealing with NRM, because of its 
width, the main definition of a successful CBNRM in previous literature can be 
used on all perspectives. It is therefore possible to develop CBNRM with these 
proposed perspectives. Since locals’ livelihoods are normally dependent on the 
natural resources, more is at stake for the citizens than for the central authorities 
regarding the management of it. Considering the importance of the resource 
management, and that many of the elements constituting Ostrom (1990) and 
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Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012) approaches are in place – although restrained – 
the development of CBNRM could benefit from a more locally established 
governance and power structure that is based in that particular context. 
This study serves as an indication of the possibility that the Western 
perspective may not always work as intended, and that contextual adaptation may 
be necessary to succeed with such initiatives.  
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10 Appendix 
Article Elements for success Non-favourable elements 
Jones, Brian & Weaver, Chris 
(2009) CBNRM in Namibia: 
Growth, Trends, Lessons and 
Constraints in ”Evolution and 
Innovation in Wildlife 
Conservation” 
 
Policy, legislation and practice should be rooted in local needs 
Policy should provide incentives and frameworks 
The conservancy approach as an institutional model (conservancy model 
provides institutional model based on common property institutional 
principles, which can be used for management of other NRs) 
Importance of scale in CBNRM (problem with wildlife as it moves over 
large areas -> problem of ownership. Many large conservancies are now 
splitting into smaller, which is also better for transparency and 
accountability) 
Devolution to the lowest appropriate level (conservancy committees tend 
to become accountable upwards to the organisations that provide funding 
and technical support rather than downwards to the organisation’s 
members) 
Importance of intrinsic incentives for conservation (there is a shifting 
balance in between intrinsic (cultural and aesthetic) and instrumental 
incentives such as economic benefits) 
Balance between process and product (implementation based on process 
rather than pre-determined products or outcomes. Process-oriented 
approach implies participation in decision-making by residents 
themselves) 
Importance of light touch facilitation (working directly with communities 
and not only through local government institutions or traditional leaders. 
NGO’s should not become ”gatekeepers” between community and 
outsiders) 
 Strong property rights 
 
 Government reluctant to give up 
power to conservancies. Have placed 
additional restrictions on the ability of 
the conservancies to take crucial 
management decisions. 
 Proprietorship given to conservancies 
limited and conditional. Most 
management decisions (i.e. when to 
and how to harvest) are still taken by 
government. 
 Lack of secure and exclusive group 
land tenure. Communities cannot 
prevent other people using the land 
that they wish to use for i.e. wildlife 
tourism.  
 Unclear and unstable institutional 
environment. Institutions claim 
overlapping authority over land and 
NRs. 
 Lack of capacity of NGO’s and 
government to provide support to the 
growing number of conservancies.  
Ribot, Jesse (2003) ”Democratic 
decentralisation of natural 
resources: institutional choice 
and discretionary power 
transfers in sub-saharan Africa” 
Public Administration and 
Development, 23, 53-65 
 
GS + F - C:51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(GS = General Search, F = 
Failure, S = Success, C = 
Citations) 
 Key to effective decentralisation is increased broad-based participation in 
local public decision-making. 
Downwardly accountable  authorities (including non-electoral 
accountability mechanisms), 
 representative authorities with 
 meaningful discretionary powers (chicken and egg-problem of balance 
between capacity and power) 
= basic institutional elements of decentralisation that should lead to 
efficiency, equity and development. 
 
Some degree of democracy - a locally accountable local institution - is the 
first element of effective decentralisation. Discretion over NR use and 
management becomes the power that makes that representation 
meaningful.  
 ”Subsidarity principle”: decisions to be located at the lowest possible 
political-administrative level without negative effect on the higher level. 
This is not followed in any African country. 
 ”Means of transfer”: can be constitutional, legislative or may take place 
through ministerial decrees or administrative orders. Constitutional 
transfers are the most secure (distinction between rights and privileges 
important).  
Many countries 
Transfer decision-making powers to 
various unaccountable local bodies, 
threatening local equity and the 
environment (i.e. donors often sideline 
elected local authorities owing to a 
general lack of confidence in them) 
 Devolve insufficient powers and 
benefits either to constitute a 
decentralisation or to motivate local 
actors to carry out new environmental 
management responsibilities. 
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Shackleton, Sheona - Campbell, 
Bruce - Wollenberg, Eva - 
Edmunds, David (2002) 
”Devolution and community-
based natural resource 
management: creating space for 
local people to participate and 
benefit?” 
 Transfer authority directly to disadvantaged people tends to be more 
responsive to local needs than those that allocate control to higher levels 
of social organisations, such as local government.  
 Assistance should allow for diverse constitutional forms to exist, 
providing certain democratic standards are met. 
 
Capacity building needed, including: 
 Improving representation, 
 Accountability, 
 Transparency  
 Promoting pluralistic processes that involve disadvantaged groups.  
 
 
 State provides benefits as an incentive 
to encourage people to support 
activities that meet government 
revenue or conservation interests 
rather than local livelihood needs.  
 Lack of authority to deal with raiding 
wildlife (trade-offs for community). 
 In many countries stakeholders other 
than the intended beneficiaries decided 
how income was to be used.  
 Central authorities - despite rhetoric to 
the contrary - continued to drive the 
NRM agenda.  
 Overlapping/unclear 
mandates/jurisdictions leads to 
institutional conflicts and struggles for 
power and revenues.  
Andersson, Krister - Gibson, 
Clark - Lehoucq, Fabrice (2004) 
”The politics of decentralized 
natrual resource governance” 
Local politicians will invest their time and resources into activities only if 
they reap political or financial rewards from doing so. -> incentives for 
politicians, not individuals in the community. 
 Regulatory powers would increase their ability to reward followers. 
 Fiscal and regulatory benefits would give local authorities incentives to 
participate actively in a decentralised policy. 
 
Interest groups may undermine NR policy it they seek to extend their i e 
land. -> the strength of demands of organised interest groups. 
 
If there are no gains from the decentralised policy, and the central 
government does not monitor local politicians compliance, it is less likely 
that a politician will invest much time or energy into the policy. Central 
government can assert influence by imposing costs for non-compliance. 
 Availability and value of NR influence local politicians engagement. 
Market access may increase the value of NR. 
 Some argue that presence of indigenous people will result in better 
protection of environmental resources.  
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Ribot, Jesse (2004) ”Waiting for 
democracy: the politics of 
choice in natural resource 
decentralisation”. 
Accountability and institutional choice 
 Meaningful discretionary powers are given to local level. 
 Accountability 
Subsidarity priniciples and the choice of sequencing of power 
Powers must be chosen and transferred 
 Clear environmental subsidarity principles will help guide the choice of 
powers to allocate to different levels of authority in and out of 
government.  
 Adequate, clear laws in place. 
Capacity not necessarily before power.  
 Requiring local users to adhere to minimum standards instead of 
developing complex management plans may be a better option. 
Factors besides the ”actors, powers, accountability model” many of which 
can be legislated or provided by central government: 
 Attention to inter- and intra-jurisdictional equity 
legal recognition for local organisations 
legal protections for organising, lobbying and filling suit 
 Availability of technical support from central government 
 Civic education 
 The right and ability to federate local authorities and organisations 
 The right of local authorities to control outside extractive industries.  
 Appropriate electoral codes and laws that transfer executive, legislative 
and judicial powers. 
 
 Power is being transferred to non-state 
institutions instead of local democratic 
institutions. Power is being siphoned 
away from the representative bodies 
that could otherwise become the 
institutionalised form of popular 
participation. 
 Decentralisation reforms are often 
used as a means of concentrating the 
power by choosing local institutions 
they can more easily control.  
Boudreaux, Karol - Nelson, 
Fred (2011) ”Community 
conservation in Namibia: 
empowering the poor with 
property rights” 
 
 Theory: commitment from national-level political leaders to see projects 
succeed, a willingness on the part of the affected bureaucracy to provide 
effective support, competent and committed local actors to implement 
projects, and appropriate timing. 
 Additional requirements may include participation from CSO’s, support 
from donors and partnerships with private-sector actors.   
 Thicker bundles of property rights encourage local people to act 
entrepreneurally while so attending to local conservation needs.  
 Problems related to land tenure 
 Human/wildlife conflict 
 Capacity and 
governance/management issues 
 -> government needs to address these 
issues 
Roe, Dilys - Nelson, Fred - 
Sandbrook, Chris (Eds.) (2009) 
” Community management of 
natural resources in Africa: 
Impacts, experience and future 
directions”. 
 CBNRM represents a spectrum of management from traditional to 
modern (one should not distinguish between ”formal” - i e state-supported 
- and ”informal” CBNRM. 
 CBNRM should explicitly embrace development and conservation 
objectives (not just focus on conservation). 
 Focus on demand driven collective management arrangements (support 
local communities and CSO’s by building their capacity to engage in 
collective action that builds stronger political constituencies for resource 
governance reforms). 
 Tenure and rights do not guarantee conventional conservation outcomes 
(integrated and community-driven CBNRM will increase the likelihood of 
fiscal, ecological and institutional sustainability by granting communities 
more options.  
 Improved indicators and better monitoring by communities are needed. 
  
Success will only happen when CBNRM facilitation prioritises local 
interests, agency and capacity. Stakeholder roles needs rethinking in the 
way they support and engage with rural communities: 
 Donors: long-term, flexible and responsive to local needs. 
 Civil society: balancing civic duty with implementation. 
 Governments: key responsibilities and scarce resources (prioritise more 
support for implementation of existing laws and policies that often already 
promote devolved management) 
 The private sector: a significant but potentially risky ally (develop codes 
of conduct that facilitate long-term local rights and penalise inappropriate 
behaviour.   
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Fabricius, C - Collins, S (2007) 
”Community-based natural 
resource management: 
governing the commons”. 
 
F + S - C: 7 
Invest heavily in the development of functioning and resilient governance 
systems in the early stages of projects. Many obstacles can be overcome 
by focusing on the following aspects of governance: 
 Knowledge networks that draw on experience and wisdom of key 
individuals 
 Formalised decision-making structures with clear constitutions and codes 
of conduct. 
 Clearly defined and legitimised conflict resolution procedures  
 Legitimacy and acceptance of the governance structure by community 
members, traditional authorities etc. 
 Formal commitment to well defined roles and responsibilities by key 
individuals in the network. 
 Tangible incentives to key individuals for meeting their commitments  
 Professional facilitation to promote communication between participants 
in the knowledge network document the lessons learnt on an on-going 
basis. 
 
Dialogues between local communities, scientists and government (so 
called ”trialogue”). 
Shortages in critical types of capital 
(social and natural capital) in remote 
rural areas where most CBNRM 
programmes are situated makes the 
programmes vulnerable to early shocks 
and surprise.  
 
Critical obstacles to CBNRM mostly 
relate to failed governance and in 
particular the failure of cooperative 
learning networks between scientists, 
government and local communities: 
 Slow pace of development  
 Weak participation by local, national 
and provincial government. 
 Poor coordination 
 Weak local and municipal governance 
structures 
 Conflicts about how costs and benefits 
should be distributed. 
 Historical legacies of separate 
development.  
Kanapaux, William - Child, 
Brian (2011) ”Livelihood 
activities in a Namibian wildlife 
conservancy: a case study of 
variation within a CBNRM 
programme”.  
 
 
 
 Conservancies as an institution must interact with government, traditional 
authorities and customary livelihood practices.  
 Changes in economic conditions mediated by institutional factors are the 
main drivers of land-use change.  
 Understanding how people within a conservancy make their livelihoods 
is a first step towards understanding how the conservancy could shape 
future livelihood strategies and land-use decisions.  
 Reliability is important on a local level. Everything hinges on the success 
or failure of a household’s livelihood activities, and these activities are in 
large part determined by factors beyond the household’s control (i e 
threats as crop raiding). CBNRM programmes must take this into 
account.  
 Differences between communities. 
Institutions that do not recognise these 
differences can disrupt existing 
physical and social spaces or replicate 
old patterns of discrimination. 
They also run the risk of ignoring or 
simplifying the diverse set of formal 
and informal institutions that shape 
access to environmental resources and 
services.  
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Measham, Thomas - Lumbasi, 
Jared (2013) ”Success factors 
for community-based natural 
resource management 
(CBNRM): lessons from Kenya 
and Australia” 
 Local initiation 
 Adequate incentives for resource management 
 Local autonomy of implementation 
 Compatibility with local livelihoods (focus of each project on 
conservation issues are locally relevant rather than part of a broader 
political or ideological agenda exogenous to the focal region) 
 Limited dependence on local natural resources for local livelihoods. 
 Attachments to specific environments (e.g. particular forests or rivers) 
has been noted as an important motivation for voluntary participation in 
conservation activities. 
 
 Complex administrative structures 
  Top down project initiation (when 
externally initiated and imposed on 
local communities, they can seem alien 
and local residents may lack 
motivation to make the project work). 
 Lack of economic incentives to 
sustainably manage a resource relative 
to other options such as illegal 
poaching, especially when 
communities have limited livelihood 
options and tax revenues are withheld 
from local institutions. 
 Lack of autonomy (intervening high 
levels of government leading to 
compromised applications which 
undermine both the integrity of 
participation and the effectiveness of 
conservation programmes). 
 Incompatible livelihoods and 
opportunity costs (opportunity costs to 
high or project fails to add value to 
pre-existing resource use. 
Campbell, Bruce - Shackleton, 
Sheona (2001) ”The 
organisational structures for 
communtiy-based natural 
resource management in 
southern Africa” 
 Real commitment by government to transfer management authority (and 
the full bundle of rights) to the lowest level possible 
 Clarity around the mandates of and relationships to different stakeholders 
such as traditional leaders, local government and line departments 
 Integrating CBNRM organisations within local government organisations 
 Ensuring representativeness and accountability of management 
organisations  
 Dedicated facilitation (often by NGO’s) that builds capacity and 
flexibility 
 Recognising the importance of traditional leaders  
 Planning for private sector and their ability to generate income based on 
the natural resource 
 Recognising that the value of the resource will be a key variable in 
determining the kind of organisational structure that is likely to be 
successful  
 Bureaucratic delay: sometimes used 
as a tactic by government due to lack 
of faith in their policies, and in other 
instances because bureaucracy has not 
realised the logistical implications of 
its new policies and is therefore 
unprepared to deal with 
implementation aspects. 
Hutton et al (2005) ”Back to the 
Barriers? Changing Narratives 
in Biodiversity Conservation” 
Forum for Development 
Studies, 32:2, 341-371 
 
GS - C: 85 
Incentives, such as economic benefits to which they have entitlement, for 
the people to maintain species and habitats. 
Interventions must be socially and politically feasible and morally just. 
National level enforcement is most effective when it compliments local 
institutions’ moral economy. Bottom-up approaches can support effective 
conservation. 
Policy and legislation reforms have not 
resulted in sufficient community 
control over natural resources. 
No real devolution of power and 
authority over resources, including 
land, from the state to local people. 
Poor quality of project design and 
unqualified nature of many of those 
attempting implementation. 
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Thakadu (2005) ”Success 
Factors in Community Based 
Natural Resources Management 
in Northern Botswana: Lessons 
from Practice” Natural 
Resources Forum, 29, 199-212 
 
S - C: 23 
Derived benefits must outweigh the costs.  
People will conserve and manage only such resources they perceive to 
contribute positively to there quality of life. When people’s quality of life 
is enhanced, their efforts and commitment to ensure the future well-being 
of the resource is also enhanced. 
Broadly based participation 
Credibility and mutual trust (monitoring and frequent interactive meetings 
with local communities)  
Willingness and readiness (acceptance of project and understanding of the 
concepts involved and its capacity to implement the project) 
Perceived benefits and their distribution (immediate needs at the village 
levels must be addressed, such as poverty alleviation, empowerment 
security etc) 
Socio-economic and cultural stratification (identify the existing social 
groupings and work will all of them to ensure community solidarity) 
Lack of accountability 
Project domineering by an enlightened 
few 
Failure to address diversity within 
communities has in some localities 
made people suspicious, delayed 
progress and undermined participation. 
Blaikie, Piers (2006) ”Is Small 
Really Beautiful? Community-
based Natural Resource 
Management in Malawi and 
Botswana” World 
Development, 34:11, 1942-1957 
 
GS + F - C: 132 
The unequal power relation could be palliated by participatory and 
inclusionary techniques by which form of hybrid or knowledge can be 
negotiated and implemented. 
Bridging-points between the outsider (i.e. NGO’s) and the local. These are 
decentralisation and participation.Both imply a movement of decision-
making and real political power from the central to more local levels.  
Participation in decision-making requires: transparency in transactions, 
accountability downwards, the granting of a considerable degree of local 
discretion over environmental decision making and a degree of 
competence, confidence and political sophistication by local institutions. 
Local covenants should be drawn up by all local stakeholders to avoid 
standardisation and blueprinting.  
There is an over belief in the 
”community’s” gemeinschaft. 
The contradiction in the label CBNRM 
of having the reforms and policies 
developed by scientists with its 
foundation in objectivity, but at the 
same time taking the local knowledge 
into account which is embedded in 
histories and onsite negotiations face-
to-face. 
This unequal power relation could be 
palliated by participatory and 
inclusionary techniques, but local 
knowledge has often not been able to 
negotiate on an equal basis of 
scientific knowledge, but has instead 
been shaped by what is feared by 
outsiders who make strategic choices 
about which local knowledge is heard 
and conformable to the scientifically 
given environmental goals. 
Legislation and ”blueprinting” 
Ribot et al (2006) 
”Recentralizing While 
Decentralizing: How National 
Governments Reappropriate 
Forest Resources” World 
Development, 34:11, 1864-1886 
 
GS - C: 130 
 
The ability of accountable local authorities and governments to make and 
implement decisions is the key feature of effective decentralisation.  
This ability, which defines the responsiveness of local authorities, requires 
discretionary powers. 
Accountability or sanctions beckons leaders to respond; responsiveness is 
a function of discretionary powers.  
A full sense of accountability will emerge when elections become 
institutionalised.  
Need for mechanisms of accountability that might supplement electoral 
ones - such as ombudsmen, active media reporting and effective 
judiciaries.  
Decentralisation reforms may be made more comprehensive by attending 
to four important issues: (a) to be aware of the ways in which specific 
arguments and mechanisms are used to compromise democratic 
decentralisation, and to recognise that the real reasons behind those 
arguments are not the ones being stated, (b) downwardly accountable 
institutions should be constructed at various levels of government 
(including those going beyond the electoral process), (c) accountable local 
officials should process discretionary powers that offer a secure domain of 
autonomous decision-making, and funding that allows these decisions to 
be implemented, (d) in order to overcome central government resistance, 
”broad coalitions” that bring together a diversity of interest groups from 
different sectors of society and government could provide an effective 
institutional forum for the promotion of democratic decentralisation.   
Central governments often transfer 
insufficient and/or inappropriate 
powers, and make policy and 
implementation choices that serve to 
preserve their own interests and 
powers. 
Fundamental aspects of 
decentralisation, including 
discretionary powers and downwardly 
accountable representative authorities, 
are missing in practice.  
No right to allocate revenue-rich 
commercial rights to exploit forests; 
more often, they gain the power to 
allocate commercially irrelevant use 
rights for products such as fodder and 
non-commercial firewood. 
Lack of information provided to local 
governments about new reforms 
compromises their ability to make 
demands on the central government 
and their capacity to manage resources 
effectively.  
Lack of legal clarity. 
The devolution of management 
responsibilities without corresponding 
funds to carry them out. 
By controlling the amount of space 
over which local authorities can 
exercise their power, it becomes 
possible to control the extent of 
decentralisation. 
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Nelson, Fred - Agrawal, Arun (2008) 
”Patronage or Participation? 
Community-based Natural Resource 
Management Reform in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” Development and Change, 
39:4, 557-585 
 
GS - C: 40 
Transparency and accountability of governing institutions is a basic 
determinant of public officials to capture wildlife’s economic value and 
use it for patronage purposes or personal profit, and to consolidate central 
control over the resources. Hence: transparency and accountability is 
needed.  
The more transparent the mechanisms for allocating commercial wildlife 
use rights, the lower the rents public officials can extract by virtue of their 
gatekeeper status.  
Functioning rule of law. 
Lower levels of corruption. 
Higher per capita incomes (or corruption might increase). 
The central state does not relinquish 
enough control to local people eager to 
receive it.  
Outcomes of CBNRM and 
decentralisation are strongly 
conditioned by the institutional 
incentives facing political decision-
makers. 
Incentives are in turn shaped by the 
size and structure of the tourist hunting 
industry. The financial value of trophy 
hunting activities, when directly 
controlled by state agencies and 
carried out on community lands, 
amplifies incentives to maintain 
control and to resist devolutionary 
reforms.  
Lack of influence of local 
communities and civil society may 
reflect the dominant role of governing 
elites and foreign donors in broader 
economic policy formulation and 
decision-making processes. 
Oyono, Phil René (2004) ”One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? 
Paradoxes of Natural Resources 
Management Decentralisation in 
Cameroon” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 42:1, 91-111 
 
GS + S - C: 35 
Real powers must be transferred unequivocally to decentralized bodies 
(local management committees and communes). 
Powers to manage forests and benefits accruing therefrom as well as 
powers to make decisions about local management. 
Corruption free central administration. 
Implementation of a monitoring system with the aim of following up 
”administrative behaviours” of national and sub-national authorities, 
while facilitating downward accountability and sanctioning enforcement 
at both regional and village levels.  
Resistance at ”the top” to policy 
innovations. 
Slow process (of administration) after 
application for establishing a 
”Community forest”. 
Self-appointed committee members. 
Accountability only upwards. 
”Reconcentration” of powers in the 
hands of the administration. 
Misappropriated funds by the regional 
level with the active complicity of 
village-level committee members. 
Misappropriation of expected profit. 
Absence of participatory culture and 
the persistence of command reflexes in 
the agents of the state at different 
levels (provincial and regional). 
The management of the forests has 
been diverted and taken over at the 
regional level by the administrative 
and municipal authorities, and the 
”external elites” of the villages. This 
dominant group marches to corruption. 
Weak system for social control. 
No strong organisational schemes, 
internal rules or an infrastructure of 
sanctions governing the functioning of 
management committees. 
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Nunan, Fiona (2006) ”Empowerment 
and Institutions: Managing Fisheries 
in Uganda” World Development, 
34:7, 1316-1332 
 
GS - C: 22 
Empowerment to enable more marginalised users to claim rights of access 
to and control over natural resources through existing and altered 
institutions. 
Creating networks of structures (for lake management). 
Ensuring accountability (elections for committee, representatives 
reporting to constituents and seeking approval for key decisions). 
Devolving rule-making powers. 
Establishing poverty-focused access rights and benefits from natural 
resources. 
Managing conflict and integrating natural resource management with 
wider socio-economic development initiatives.  
 
Sebele, Lesego S. (2010) 
”Community-Based Tourism 
Ventures, Benefits and Challenges: 
Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust, 
Central District, Botswana” Tourism 
Management, 31, 136-146 
 
GS - C: 21 
Involvement/participation in decision-making process. Lack of tangible benefits and 
employment creation. 
Loss of benefits from the land. 
Poor management. 
Lack of marketing and entrepreneurial 
skills. 
Lack of community involvement and 
participation. 
No sense of ownership of the project 
amongst the community members. 
Heavy reliance on foreign donors. 
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Virtanen, Pekka (2003) ”Local 
Management of Global Values: 
Community-Based Wildlife 
Management in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia” Society & Natural 
Resources: An International Journal, 
16:3, 179-190 
 
S - C: 19 
Initiative and control of new activities must be devolved to communal 
residents themselves.  
Instead of strengthening the state through deconcentration, the programme 
should create effective mechanisms for downward accountability.  
Limited access to environmental 
resources. 
Elite capture. 
High livelihood costs for rural people. 
Unequal costs and benefits at 
individual and household level. 
CAMPFIRE rule systems often have 
no link to local values and priorities, 
and consequently they enjoy limited 
local legitimacy.  
Mbaiwa, J. E. (2004) ”The Success 
and Sustainability of Community-
Based Natural Resource 
Management in the Okavango Delta, 
Botswana” South African 
Geographical Journal, 86:1, 44-53 
 
 
Local involvement in the resource management that at the same time is 
making them derive direct socio-economic benefits from the resources. 
Success in determining the economic value of natural resources, 
especially wildlife, has resulted in the development of positive attitudes of 
the rural communities towards natural resource conservation, particularly 
wildlife.  
Stakeholders (government, community-based organisations, private sector 
and NGO’s) must share information, build communication networks, 
promote trust and transparent decision making.  
Community mobilisation and organisation should be carried out by the 
communities and be directed by their goals and ideas (= ownership). 
Policies fail to define the objectives of 
government in relation to CBNRM and 
do not provide firm guidance for its 
implementation. 
Local people are given partial rights to 
manage land and wildlife resources but 
much of it remains centralised as land 
is only leased to the people for a 15 
years period and wildlife resources 
wholly remain the property of 
government except the quota allocated 
to the community. 
Lack of entrepreneurship and 
managerial skills in the tourism 
business. 
Lack of training and capacity building. 
Insecurity of tenure. 
Conflicts between stakeholders. 
Management problems of community 
trusts and misuse of funds. 
Lack of understanding of the CBNRM 
concepts by the local communities. 
Poor distribution of CBNRM financial 
and employment benefits. 
Enclave tourism (foreign own tourism) 
and CBNRM compete for the same 
resources and clientele.  
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Brockington, Dan (2008) 
”Corruption, Taxation and Natural 
Resource Management in Tanzania” 
Journal of Development Studies, 
44:1, 103-126 
 
F - C: 8 
 
Real power over finances and resource use. 
Downward accountability in the form of elections. 
Strong centralising forces and weak 
capacity of local government. 
”Institutional violence” such as 
extraction of taxation, 
misappropriation and misallocation of 
fund, and the corruption and failure of 
accountability. 
Lack of transparency and information 
about expenditure on local projects by 
officials 
Meshack, Charles K. - Ahdikari, 
Bhim - Doggart, Nike - Lovett, Jon 
C. (2006) ”Transaction Costs of 
Community-Based Forest 
Management: Empirical Evidence 
from Tanzania” African Journal of 
Ecology, 44, 468-477 
 
F + S - C: 20 
 
Equity in sharing benefits and costs. 
Incentives to manage the forests (benefits). Generally, this means that 
they need to be able to recoup their costs and be able to protect those 
values they consider important.  
Revenue sharing 
Dominating government the 
community decision-making fora 
through district authorities. 
Communities are rarely in a position to 
voice arguments for forest 
management activities that maximise 
their net benefits from the forests and 
fulfill livelihood needs. 
Table 5: Elements of success and failure in previous literature.  
 
 
